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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Ms. Rita Hoagland

individually, as an heir and as personal representative for denial of her deceased son's Fourteenth
Amendment right to medical care and safety while he was a detainee at the Ada County Jail
where his life was taken by suicide.
B.

Course of Proceedings
On January 23, 2009, Ms. Hoagland filed a complaint in the Fourth District Court,

Ada County, against Ada County and certain employees of the Ada County Jail (the "Jail"),
seeking monetary damages, Ms. Hoagland filed an amended complaint on July 12,2010, which
dismissed all the original Defendants except for Ada County and the Sheriff, while adding the
Defendants that now appear in the caption (collectively the "Ada County Defendants"). On
September 14, 2010, Ms. Hoagland filed her Third Amended Complaint.
On September 20, 2010, the Ada County Defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds of
standing.

On November 2, 2010, the trial court granted in part and denied in part the

Defendants' motion by dismissing Count I of Ms. Hoagland's Complaint. Ms. Hoagland brought
Count I in her capacity as heir and personal representative of her son's estate.
On November 12, 2010, the Ada County Defendants answered the Third Amended
Complaint and at the same time moved for summary judgment.

On November 23, 2010,

Ms. Hoagland moved for reconsideration of the trial court's November 2, 2010 order of
dismissal.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

1

On January 20, 2011, the trial court granted in part the Ada County Defendants' motion
for summary judgment, which dismissed all of the Ada County Defendants except James
Johnson ("Johnson"). The trial court also denied Ms. Hoagland's motion for reconsideration of
its November 2,2011 ruling dismissing Count I of her Complaint.
On February 3,2011, Johnson moved for reconsideration of the trial court's January 20,
2011 order, seeking judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. On February 7, 2011,
Ms. Hoagland moved for reconsideration of the trial court's January 20, 2011 order and thereby
sought reinstatement of her claims against some of the Ada County Defendants.
On March 28, 2011, the trial court granted Johnson summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity, and denied Ms. Hoagland's motion for reconsideration. The Ada County
Defendants thereafter filed a memorandum of costs, and Ms. Hoagland moved to disallow costs.
After hearing, the trial court denied Ms. Hoagland' s motion to disallow costs and awarded the
Ada County Defendants $93,253.43 in costs.
On May 4, 2011, Ms. Hoagland filed her Notice of Appeal. Final Judgment was entered
on May 25, 2011. A Judgment for Costs was entered on October 24, 2011, and Ms. Hoagland
filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on October 28,2011.
C.

Statement of Facts
On September 29, 2008, Bradley Munroe ("Bradley") took his life while he was a

detainee at the Ada County Jail ("Jail"). I

The night before, Bradley had been arrested for

I R. pp. 290-91 (Overson Aff., ~, 26-29,33-34, Exs. 13-17), 1402-03 (Overson Aff., ~~ 15-19),
2074 (Overson Aff." 5, Ex. D (.pdfpp. 223-308) (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 59-119».
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robbing a convenience store. 2 The arresting officers found Bradley's behavior so bizarre that
they took him to the hospital for evaluation. 3 After the hospital, Bradley was taken to the Jail,
where he continued acting strangely.4 The officers at the Jail were not able to book him into the
Jail because of his behavior, and ultimately they put him on suicide watch in an observation cell. 5
Jail records indicate that Bradley threatened his own life and his clothes were taken away after he
tried to strangle himself with them. 6 Bradley remained on suicide watch until the following
morning when Johnson, who was one of the Jail's psychiatric social workers, removed Bradley
from suicide watch status. 7
1. Wroblewski's contact with Bradley.

Jeremy Wroblewski ("Wroblewski") was a deputy for the Ada County Jail.8 His first
involvement with Bradley was at 7:02 a.m. on September 28,2008. 9 He reviewed a security log
kept by the Jail that relayed some of Bradley's behaviors from the night before, including his
attempt to tie string around his neck. 10 Bradley was removed from his observation cell at about

R. p. 2074 (Overson Aff." 5, Ex. D (.pdfpp. 207-22) (Defs" 2d Supp. Resp. 59-119».
3 Id.
4 R. pp. 159-65.
5 R. pp. 159-65, 290-91 (Overson Aff., " 26-29, 33-34, Exs. 13-17), 1402-3 (Overson Aff.,
~, 15-19), 2074 (Overson Aff." 5, Ex. D (.pdfpp. 223-74) (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 59-119».
R. pp. 290-91 (Overson Aff.", 26-29,33-34, Exs. 13-17),1402-3 (Overson Aff., ,,15-19),
2074 (Overson Aff." 5, Ex. D (.pdfpp. 223-74) (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 59-119».
7 Id.
8 R. pp. 2073-77 (Overson Aff."
8, Ex. F (.pdfp. 575) (Wroblewski Dep., 6:18-7:4).
9 R. pp.135-140, 2073-77 (Overson Aff., , 8, Ex. F (.pdf pp.584-86, 621-22, 650-51)
(Wroblewski Dep., 45: 17 -51 :4, Ex. F».
10 !d.
2
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7:52 a.m., and at about 8:00 a.m., Wroblewski started fingerprinting Bradley.ll At 8:01 a.m.,
social worker Johnson arrived and talked to Bradley until 8:04 a.m. and then left the area. 12
While Johnson and Bradley spoke, Wroblewski continued to fingerprint Bradley.13 Wroblewski
finished fingerprinting Bradley at 8:05 a.m. 14 From 8:06 a.m. to 8:34 a.m., Bradley placed four
calls from the Jail. ls However, Wroblewski estimated the time at 8:26 a.m. when he moved
Bradley to a different office where Wroblewski and Bradley completed Bradley's intake health
•

.

questIOnnaire.

16

According to Wroblewski, he and Bradley completed the health questionnaire at
8:33 a.m. l7 During the questioning, Wroblewski noted that Bradley's appearance was "poor"
and he looked sick, smelled of alcohol and appeared to be under the influence of aicohol.
Bradley said he had been on an antidepressant. 19

I8

During the questioning, Bradley told

Wroblewski he was seeing visions C'Shadow People") and hearing voices telling him to run; that

II R. pp. 135-140,1437-40 (Overson Aff., ~ 2, Ex. A (video CD)), 2073-77 (Overson Aff., ~
Ex. F (.pdfpp. 577-86,590-91,598-610,621-23,650-51) (Wroblewski Dep., 17:4-19:3, 19:1019,20:22-29:15,31:12-32:1,33:18-35:24, 37:10-51:4, 67:4-70:4, Exs. B-G)), 2627-28 (Overson
Aff, ~ 13, Ex. 11 (video CD)).
12 Id.; see also R. pp. 183-87.
13 !d.
14 I d.
IS R. pp.729-30, 1398-1407, 2074 (Overson Aff., 11 6, Ex. E (.pdf pp. 389-90) (Investigative
Report, pp. 8-9)).
16 R. p. 2075 (Overson AfT., 11 8, Ex. F (.pdfpp. 583, 590-91, 598-610, 623) (Wroblewski Dep.,
40:9-14,67:4-70:4, Exs. B-E & G)).
17 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff., 11 8, Ex. F (.pdfpp. 584, 598-99, 602-10) (Wroblewski Dep., 44:2345:16, Exs. B, D, & E)).
18 R. p.2075 (Overson Aff., 1I 8, Ex. F (.pdf pp. 586, 606-10) (Wroblewski Dep., 51 :7-52:25,
Ex. E)).
19 !d.
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he had recently been in a psychiatric care hospital; that he had contemplated suicide; and that he
had attempted suicide in the past. 20 When Wroblewski asked, "Are you now contemplating
suicideT Bradley said, '·Yes.,,21
Wroblewski answered "Yes" to the question, "Does the inmate's behavior suggest a risk
of suicideT22
When Wroblewski interviewed Bradley, Wroblewski understood Jail policy required him
to inform the medical unit if an inmate answered '-Yes" to any of the suicide questions on the
questionnaire. 23 Wroblewski told no one of the five "Yes" answers to the suicide questions. 24
2. James Johnson's contact with Bradley.

Bradley was put on suicide watch because his behavior on the evening of September 28,
2008, demonstrated that he was a threat to himself. 25 The next morning, a detention officer
called the Jail medical unit and asked that Bradley be assessed for suicide risk. 26 Johnson was
assigned the task, but before talking with Bradley, he reviewed Bradley's medical records at the

20 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff." 8, Ex. F (.pdfpp. 586-89,591,606-10,624-48) (Wroblewski Dep.,
53:18-20,59:1-63:17,65:1-6,70:19-73:8, Exs. E, H-K)).
21 !d.
22 I d.
23 Id.; see R. pp. 2896-2900 for testimony of how the policies worked in practice.
24 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff., , 8, Ex. F (.pdf pp. 586-89, 591, 606-10, 624-48) (Wroblewski Dep.,
53:18-20,59:1-63:17,65:1-6,70:19-73:8, Exs. E, H-K)).
25 R. pp. 159-65, 2074 (Overson Aff., , 5, Ex. D (.pdf pp. 207-22, 256-57, 265-69) (Defs' 2d
Supp. Resp. 1-16,92-93,110-14),,8, Ex. F (.pdfpp. 650-51) (Wroblewski Dep., Ex. L)), 262728 (Overson Aff., Ex. 13 (Ex. QQQ) (video CD)), 2877-2884 (Brewer Dep., 5:2-36:25).
76
~ R. pp. 135-40, 141-44, 159-65, 2074 (Overson Aff."
5, Ex. D (.pdfpp. 207-22, 256-57, 26569, 279) (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 1-16, 92-93, 110-14, 124), , 8, Ex. F (.pdf pp. 650-51)
(Wroblewski Dep., Ex. L)).
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Jail.27 The September 28, 2008 incarceration was Bradley's fourth incarceration at the Jai1.28
The Jail's records documented his history of suicidal ideations, suicide attempts, psychiatric
hospitalizations, mental illness, and antidepressant and antipsychotic medications to control his
mental illness. 29

The records included Johnson's own September 1, 2008 assessment of

Bradley's suicide risk during one of Bradley's previous incarcerations. 3o In that assessment,
Johnson noted that Bradley had been in a psychiatric hospital two weeks earlier for attempted
suicide; had a history of treatment for mental disorders; believed his symptoms were wellcontrolled by his medications; and was not having suicidal ideations at that time. 3l
When Johnson spoke with Bradley on the morning of September 29, 2008, he spent less
than five minutes with Bradley before clearing him from suicide watch. 32

Johnson took

Bradley's statement that he was no longer suicidal at face value, even though Bradley presented
with many of the factors that are considered as putting an inmate at high risk of suicide. 33 After

27 R. pp. 135-40, 141-44, 151-54, 293 (Overson Aff., , 62, Ex. 23), 1405 (Overson Aff., 112),
2074 (Overson Aff., , 2, Ex. A (.pdf pp. 25-51) (Robertson Dep., Exs. C-D), '9, Ex. G (.pdf
p. 670) (Defs' 5th Supp. Resp. 22)), 2663, 2667, 2674 (Johnson Dep., 126:19-25, 142:3-143:18,
172:12-16).
28 R. pp. 148-50.
29 R. pp. 135-40, 290-91, 293 (Overson Aff., " 25-29, 33-34, 62, Exs. 13-17, 23), 1402-3
(Overson Aff.", 15-19), 2074 {Overson Aff." 2, Ex A (.pdfpp. 8, 14,25-51) (Robertson Dep.,
24:1-16, 46:3-47:19, Ex. C), , 5, Ex. D (.pdf pp. 228-29,234-35, 240-41, 254-55, 275-308)
(Defs' 2d Supp. Resp.), '6, Ex. E (.pdfpp. 393-94) (Investigative Report, pp. 12-l3),' 9, Ex. G
(.pdfp. 670) (Defs' 5th Supp. Resp. 22)), 2662 (Johnson Dep., 121:24-122:2).
30 R. p. 2074 (Overson Aff., ,5, Ex. D (.pdfpp. 293) (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 138)).
31 Id.
32 R. p. 1437 (Overson Aff., Ex. A) (video CD), 2074 (Overson Aff., , 5, Ex. D (.pdf p. 271)
(Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 116).
33 R. pp. 137-39, 1437 (Overson Aff., Ex. A) (video CD), 2657-59, 2663-95 (Johnson Dep.,
101:8-15,105:16-109:2,121:24-122:2,126:19-254:6).
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Johnson left the area and Wroblewski completed the medical screening questionnaire, Bradley
was escorted to another area of the Jail for general housing. 34 Bradley told the officer escorting
him that he needed protective custody because "Everyone wants to kill me.,·35 However, Bradley
could not identify anyone that wanted to harm him. 36 The deputy told a classifications officer,
who in tum told Johnson, what Bradley had said. 37 Johnson told classifications that Bradley was
"agitated" but not suicidal, and then approved him for protective custody cell assignmentwhich is a single person cell assignment. 38 Bradley was placed by the officers in a protective
custody cell, alone, with a bunk-bed and a sheet. 39 The cell was at the end of a short hall where
officers and other prisoners could not see Bradley unless they looked through a small window. 40
Around 10:00 a.m., Ms. Hoagland called the Jail's administrative supervisor, Leslie
Robertson, and said that she was concerned about Bradley's safety.41 As Robertson understood

34 R. pp. 1437 (Overson Aff., Ex. A) (video CD), 2074 (Overson Aff., ~ 5, Ex. D (.pdf p. 271)
(Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 116),2075 (Overson Aff., ~ 9, Ex. G (.pdfp. 673) (Defs' 5th Supp. Resp.
25).
3th
) R. pp. 2075 (Overson Aff., ~ 9, Ex. G (.pdfp. 673) (Defs' 5 Supp. Resp. 25», 2628 (Overson
Aff., ~ 13, Ex. 13 (video CD».
36 Id.
37 R. pp. 131-34, 166-69,2074 (Overson Aff., ~ 5, Ex. D (.pdfp. 257) (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 93),
~ 9, Ex. G (.pdfp. 673) (Defs' 5th Supp. Resp. 25».
38 R. p. 2074 (Overson Aff., ~ 5, Ex. D (.pdfp. 257) (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 93), ~ 6, Ex. E (.pdf
f<P. 381-95) (Investigative Report, p. 3).
9 R. pp. 131-34, 166-69,2074 (Overson Aff., ~ 5, Ex. D (.pdfp. 257) (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 93),
~ 6, Ex. E (.pdfpp. 381-95) (Investigative Report, pp. 3, 10, 12-13).
40 R. p. 2628 (Overson Aff., Ex. 15 (Ex. PP».
41 R. p. 2074 (Overson Aff., ~ 2, Ex. A (Robertson Dep., pp. 17-41, Exs. B, C and D), ~ 6, Ex. E
(.pdfp. 393) (Investigative Report, p. 12).
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it, Bradley had called that morning from the Jail, threatening suicide.

42

Ms. Hoagland told

Robertson about Bradley's last three serious suicide attempts: cutting his wrist, overdosing, and
jumping from a bridge. 43 She said that Bradley had been hospitalized repeatedly for suicide
attempts, including a recent hospitalization at Intermountain.

44

After Robertson hung up with

Ms. Hoagland, Robertson relayed to Johnson all the information as she understood it from
Ms. Hoagland. 45 Johnson took no action in response to the new information.

46

Dr. Thomas White, a nationally recognized expert on the subject of in-custody suicide
screening, identified Johnson's conduct as amounting to deliberate indifference to Bradley's
serious medical and mental health, and security needs. 47 Specifically, Dr. White indicated that
Johnson's conduct was an extreme deviation from the accepted jail standards for conducting
inmate suicide assessments. 48 Dr. Jeffrey Metzner, also a nationally recognized expert on the
subject of in-custody suicide assessments and jail operations involving healthcare, testified by
affidavit that Johnson's assessment was "clearly below the standard of correctional mental health
care. ,.49 Licensed Clinical Social Worker Nathan Powell also provided his expert opinion that

R. p.2074 (Overson Aff., ,- 6, Ex. E (.pdf pp.393-94) (Defs' Resp. to Pltfs 151 RFP)
(Investigative Report, pp. 8-9).
43 R. p. 2074 (Overson Aff., ,- 5, Ex. D (.pdfp. 257) (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 93), ,- 6, Ex. E (.pdf
pp. 381-95) (Investigative Report, pp. 3, 10, 12-13).
44Id.
45 R. p.2074 (Overson Aff., '-2, Ex. A (.pdf pp. 6-14, 21-79) (Robertson Dep., 17:1-47:20,
Exs. B, C and D)).
46 R. pp. 2632-2701.
47 R. pp. 2120-2197,3012-30.
48 R. pp. 2132-34.
49 R. pp. 2091-2119 (specifically 2102).
42
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Johnson's conduct was an extreme deviation from accepted social work standards. 50
The record in this case is full of information that was presented to Johnson that indicated
that Bradley was at a serious risk of committing suicide. 51 Johnson admitted that he understood
the seriousness of the suicide risk that Bradley faced. In reference to having written in the record
on September 29, 2008, that Bradley had recently been hospitalized for suicidal intent, Johnson
testified as follows:

Q. On the 29th, when you were done speaking with Bradley, was
it your understanding that he'd been hospitalized at Intermountain
for making statements that he was going to commit suicide or an
actual attempt?
THE WITNESS: You know, I don't know for sure what my
thinking was at the time, because -- I know that I had documented
ideation and an intent, but, you know, I don't know that I was
thinking suicide attempt.
I certainly knew that he had made them in the past. But, you
know, I don't know that I was thinking, on that date, this was the
attempt that he made. But I know that he's made more than one
attempt in the past, by report of himself and other people.
And intent, actually, tends to carry a lot. When I use the word
"intent," you actually know that I have a high level of concern
about that. Because ideation is a frequent occurrence for many,
many people who never corne to the attention of mental health and
who do come to you.
Intent to hurt yourself, you know, I knew that there was a serious
50

R. pp. 2080-90.
R. pp. 135-40, 290-91 (Overson Aff., ,~ 26-29, 33-34, Exs. 13-17), 1402-3 (Overson Aff., ~
15-19), 2626, 2631-2702 (Johnson Dep., 112:18-114:9, 134:4-139:21, 142:3-242:17, 244:17254:6),2074-75 (Overson Aff., ~ 2 Ex. A (.pdf pp. 7-10,25-51) (Robertson Dep., 19:16-20:1,
24: 1-30: 19, Ex. C), ~ 5 Ex. D (.pdf pp 223-308) (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 59-72), ~ 6 Ex. E (.pdf
pp.347-48, 357-63,381-95) (Investigative Report & MedicalSOP 1-2, 105-111), ~ 8 Ex. F
(Wroblewski Dep., 39:1-24, 41:11-45:15,59:2-22,60:17-67:3, Exs. B, F), ~ 9 Ex. G (,pdfp. 670)
(Defs' 5th Supp. Resp. 22)).
51
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element. Whether I had that in my idea -- you know, in my idea
that he had actually also done the things that we know that he had
done, the overdose and the cutting -- I mean, intent actually -- I
know that this guy was planning and wanting to hurt himself.
Q. Okay. So that - - A. So I had a serious-you know, I understood the seriousness of
it. When you see my word "intent"-because, clearly, often
people with ideation don't require a higher level of observation in
the jail.
Because they say, you "These thoughts are entering my head, they
bother me, but, you know, I can manage them. I don't intend to
die. I'm not intending to hurt myself."
So intent-the fact that I wrote -'intent" makes me-it may have
been even, actually, the wrong word.
Maybe I meant he
attempted? But just the fact it's there makes me know that I was
very clear that, you know, this guy-it's been serious in the past.
Q. SO I just want to make sure I understand. Suicidal ideation
may be down here on the risk level. And then intent, the next
level. And
A. Means, available means, method, and those kinds of things
andQ. Okay.
A. -you know, planned? Means, intent--or means, method, plan,
and then attempt, yeah, you're starting to arc way up into what you
consider increased risk. 52

52

R. pp. 2691-92 (Johnson Dep., 240:14-242:17) (emphasis added).
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II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
A.

Did the trial court commit reversible error by granting Deputy Wroblewski summary

judgment on the basis that he did not fail to adequately respond when the deputy knew the
serious risk of suicide faced by the detainee?
l. Did the trial court grant Deputy Wroblewski summary judgment on an issue not
raised in his motion for summary judgment, thereby improperly relieving him of his
initial burden on summary judgment?

2. Did the trial court apply an incorrect heightened summary judgment standard by
shifting the burden to Ms. Hoagland to prove a constitutional violation before
Wroblewski had raised and supported that issue in his motion for summary judgment?
3. Was the trial court's decision to grant Deputy Wroblewski summary judgment based
on a misreading of the record?
4. Did the trial court apply an incorrect deliberate indifference standard by requiring
Ms. Hoagland to prove intentional act?
B.

Did the trial court commit reversible error by granting the Jail's social worker, James

Johnson, summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity?
1. Did James Johnson's conduct violate clearly established constitutional law?

a. Did James Johnson violate the decedent's clearly established constitutional rights
and thereby preclude application of the doctrine of qualified immunity to avoid
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?
1.

As a matter of law can an official who acts with deliberate indifference to the
constitutional rights of another ever be granted qualified immunity from
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?

b. Did James Johnson violate Ms. Hoagland's clearly established constitutional
rights and thereby preclude application of the doctrine of qualified immunity to
avoid liability under 42 U.S. C. § 1983?
i.

Was the law sufficiently established at the relevant time to put a reasonable
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social worker on notice that actions such as those of James Johnson would
violate the rights of an adult child's parent by interfering with a
constitutionally protected familial interest?
11.

Is the clearly established right at issue in a qualified immunity analysis
involving an unconstitutional death the decedent's right or the adult parent's
right who brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action?

iii. Does Idaho's Probate Code give Ms. Hoagland standing to bring a
survivorship and a wrongful death claim for the death of her son where she is
an heir and the personal representative of his estate?
IV.

Do the underlying policies of 42 U.S.c. § 1983 preclude application of
Idaho's abatement upon death rules where the constitutional wrong caused the
decedent's death?

2. Did the trial court err by confusing the reasonableness inquiry in qualified immunity
analysis with the reasonableness inquiry used to determine when the Fourth
Amendment has been violated?
3. Did the trial court err by resolving conflicting expert testimony and making
credibility determinations at the summary judgment stage, thereby denying
Ms. Hoagland her right to trial by jury?
a.

Did the trial court view the record in a light most favorable to Ms. Hoagland or
did it follow the misdirection of Nation v. State to view the facts in a light most
favorable to the party asserting immunity?

b. Should this Court expressly overrule that portion of Nation that conflicts with
Saucier v. Katz and hold that, when determining the application of qualified
immunity on a motion for summary judgment, the facts must be viewed in a light
most favorable to the injured party?
C.

Did the trial court err by granting summary judgment to Ada County on Ms. Hoagland's

42 U.S.c. § 1983 claims when there was conflicting expert testimony that the Jail had been
systematically denying and delaying medical treatment to inmates?
D.

Did the trial court err by requiring evidence of actual knowledge to satisfy the deliberate
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indifference element of Ms. Hoagland's Fourteenth Amendment claim against a Jail supervisor
sued in her individual capacity for failing to supervise and train?

E.

Where a Fourteenth Amendment violation results in death, does the decedent's 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 claim abate?
1. Does Idaho's Probate Code §§ 5-311 and 5-327 provide standing to a personal
representative to bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 survivorship claim to vindicate the
constitutional rights of the decedent despite the holding in Evans v. Twin Falls that
personal claims of the decedent abate with the decedent's death?
2. Does the Evans v. Twin Falls non-survivorship rule apply to abate all constitutional
personal injury torts of the decedent, including 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims where the
wrong complained of caused the decedent's death?

F.

Did the trial court make a mistake of law and abuse its discretion when it awarded costs

not supported by fact or law?
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law by awarding as a matter of right costs for
attempted services fees, transcription fees for depositions that were canceled, and for
exhibits that were not admitted into evidence at a hearing or trial?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law by awarding
discretionary costs to the prevailing party in the amount of$77,438.12?
a. Did the prevailing party make an adequate showing that the discretionary costs
requested were necessary, exceptional, reasonable and justly awarded to justify
the trial court's award?
b. Was this case exceptional merely because it was brought as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claim in state court as opposed to either a common law negligence claim brought
in state court or a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim brought in federal district court?
c. Did the trial court make the requisite finding that the requested discretionary costs
were necessary, exceptional, reasonable, and justly awarded against
Ms. Hoagland?
i.

Was this case exceptional?
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11.

Did the trial court make the requisite finding that the requested discretionary
costs were incurred because the case was exceptional?

iii. Did the trial court make the requisite finding that the costs were necessary and
reasonable?
d. Did the trial court apply the ·'in the interest of justice" element of LR.C.P.
54(d)(1)(D) correctly?
1.

Is a trial court's finding that "it is not unjust to award discretionary costs here"
the correct express finding that is required under LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D)?

e. Did the trial court err as a matter oflaw and abuse its discretion when it failed to
make an express finding as to Ms. Hoagland's ability to pay the awarded costs?
1.

G.

Does LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) require a trial court to consider the financial status
of a party before it awards discretionary costs against that party?

Is Ms. Hoagland entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.C. §§ 12-107

and 12-121, LA.R. 40 and 41, and under 42 U.S.C. § 1988?
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III. ARGUMENT
A.

Introduction
1. Outline of claims.

Ms. Hoagland is the mother of Bradley Munroe. Her Complaint asserts two counts under
42 U.S.c. § 1983 based on the denial of Bradley's Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care
and safety while he was detained at the Jail. Her first count is brought in her capacity as an heir
and personal representative of Bradley Munroe's estate. Her second count is brought in her
individual capacity. She has brought official capacity claims against Ada County and individual
capacity claims against certain Jail employees (collectively "Ada County Defendants"). Both
counts allege that the Ada County Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Bradley's serious
risk of suicide while he was a Jail inmate. Bradley committed suicide less than 24 hours after his
incarceration. Jail records from prior incarcerations documented Bradley's history of mental
illness and suicidality; and two of the Ada County Defendants knew Bradley was at risk for
suicide but took no action to protect him.
When Bradley was brought to the Jail, the officers could not complete the booking
process with Bradley because of his bizarre behavior (suicidal statements and trying to strangle
himself) and he was instead put on suicide watch.

He remained on suicide watch until the

following morning when the Jail's social worker, James Johnson, took Bradley off of suicide
watch and approved him for housing in general population. Johnson reviewed Bradley's Jail
records and in his deposition admitted that based on the records he understood that Bradley was
at serious risk for suicide
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that he was planning and wanting to hurt himself.

Approximately 20 minutes after Johnson spoke to Bradley, a processing deputy, Jeremy
Wroblewski, noted on the Jail's intake form which screens for suicide that Bradley told him he
was thinking of committing suicide and had attempted it before. Wroblewski noted that Bradley
appeared to him to be at risk for suicide.

However, Wroblewski took no action to protect

Bradley. After Wroblewski booked Bradley into the Jail, Bradley was put alone in a cell with a
bunk bed and a bed sheet-which Bradley used to hang himself.
2. Legal framework for Ms. Hoagland's causes of action.
a. Individual liability.

Pretrial detainees, such as Bradley, have a constitutional right under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution to reasonable medical care and safety. 53 When a
state restrains an individual's liberty, the Constitution imposes a duty on the state to provide
access to basic human needs, such as medical care and safety. 54 The Eighth Amendment protects
convicted inmates and the Fourteenth Amendment protects detainees, but the analysis used by
the courts is the same under both Amendments. 55
A jail official may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injuries arising out of the
official's deliberate indifference to a detainee's constitutional rightS. 56 "Deliberate indifference"
has a subjective element and an objective element:

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-103 (1976); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828-30
(1994); Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9 th Cir. 1994).
54 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989).
th
55 Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F. 3d 1175, 1189, n.9 (9 Cir. 2002); Frohmader v.
Wayne, 958 F.2d 1024, 1028 (1oth Cir. 1992).
-6
) Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102-103; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828; Doty, 37 F.3d at 546.
53
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[A] prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment
for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows
that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards
that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. 57
The subjective element is a question of fact which can be proven by direct or circumstantial
eVl'dence. 58
Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a
substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the
usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, and
a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a
substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious. 59
The question of fact under the objective prong is whether the officer acted reasonably under the
circumstances. 6o
Within the jail suicide context, a jailer may be held liable for a detainee's suicide when
the official: (1) knew the detainee faced a substantial risk of self-harm; and (2) disregarded that
risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. 61
b. Individual liability of supervisors and high ranking officials.

Under § 1983, a supervisor's "liability hinges upon his participation in thc deprivation of

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847 (emphasis added).
!d.
59 [d.
60 !d. at 844-47.
th
61 Short v. Smoot, 436 F.3d 422, 427 (4 Cir. 2006); Bradich ex rel. Estate of Bradich v. City of
Chicago, 413 F.3d 688, 690-92 (7th Cir. 2005); Wever v. Lincoln County, 388 F.3d 601, 605-6
(8 th Cir. 2004); Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1244 (9 th Cir.), vacated and
remanded by 131 S. Ct. 1812, reinstated in part by 658 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2011); Conn v. City of
Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1096-1098 (9 th Cir.), vacated and remanded by, 131 S. Ct. 1812, reinstated
in part by, 658 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2011); Snow ex reI. Snow v. City of Citronelle, 420 F.3d 1262,
1268 (11 th Cir. 2005).
57

58
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constitutional rights. ,,62 Such participation can include ;'setting in motion a series of acts by
others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the
constitutional injury. ,,63

It also may include creating a policy or custom under which

unconstitutional practices occur; allowing such a policy or custom to continue; or being grossly
negligent in the management of the subordinates who caused the unlawful condition or event. 64
A supervisor is grossly negligent or deliberately indifferent when he "knew or should
have known" that there was a high degree of risk that a subordinate would violate someone's
rights but "either deliberately or recklessly disregarded that risk by failing to take action that a
reasonable supervisor would find necessary to prevent such a risk, and that failure caused a
constitutional injury. ,,65

Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9 th Cir. 1991); Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123,
140 (2 nd Cir. 2002).
th
63 Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1342 (9 Cir. 1990).
nd
64 Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865,873 (2
Cir. 1995); Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319,323-4
nd
(2 Cir. 1986); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 200 (5 th Cir. 1996); Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d
298,303-04 (5 th Cir. 1987); Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d 675,679-81 (5 th Cir. 1980); Simms v.
Adams, 537 F.2d 829 (5 th Cir. 1976); Ghandi v. Police Dept. of Detroit, 747 F2d 338 (6 th Cir.
1984); Burgess v. Moore, 39 F.3d 216 (8 th Cir. 1994); Clay v. Conlee, 815 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8 th
Cir.1987); Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446-47 (9 th Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 972 (1992)); Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630,645-46 (9 th Cir. 1991); Ybarra v.
Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, et al., 723 F.2d 675, 680 (9 th Cir. 1984); Meade v.
Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1528 (10 th Cir. 1988); McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d 693, 695-96
(1oth Cir. 1979); In re State Police Litigation, 888 F. Supp. 1235 (D.C. Conn. 1995); Liability of
Supervisory Officials and Governmental Entities for Having Failed to Adequately Train,
Supervise, or Control Individual Police Officers Who Violate Plaintiff's Civil Rights Under
42 US.C.A. § 1983, 70 A.L.R. Fed. 17 (1984) and Cumulative Supplement.
65 Poe, 282 F.3d at 142.
62
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c. Municipal liability official capacity claims.
Official capacity claims are effectively claims against the municipality.66 A plaintiff may
prevail on an official capacity claim under § 1983 by showing deliberate indifference in the
"execution of a governmenfs policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those
whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy," that was a moving force in
inflicting a constitutional injury. 67 A claim against a municipality may be established either by
direct liability or by liability by omission. 68
i.

Direct liability

To establish direct liability, it must be shown "that a municipality itself violated
someone's rights or that it directed its employee to do SO.,,69 It holds municipalities liable for
their official acts pursuant to their policies, regulations, customs, or usages. 70 To prevail under a
direct liability theory, the following elements are required: (l) the county must have had a
policy, regulation, custom, or usage that posed a substantial risk to the plaintiff; (2) it must have
been aware that its policy posed this risk; and (3) its policy, regulation, custom, or usage was a
moving force behind the constitutional violation.71 The entity's awareness can be shown by
direct or circumstantial evidence. 72

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985).
Monell v. Dep 't a/Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
68 Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1185-86.
69 I d. at 1185.
th
70 Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1444 (9 Cir. 1994).
71 Id.; Gibson, 290 F .3d at 1188.
72 Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1190.
66

67
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A plaintiff may prove a municipality operates under an unofficial policy by showing
evidence of a "persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees, which ... is so
common and well settled as to constitute a custom that represents municipal policy:,73 A single
instance of medical care denied or delayed is generally insufficient to establish municipal
liability on the basis of a custom or usage. However, repeated examples of such failures may
support a finding of deliberate indifference and result in municipal liability. 74
ii.

Liability by omission

A plaintiff can prove a municipal's liability through its omission by showing either: (1) a
failure to train; (2) a failure to implement constitutionally sound policies; (3) a failure to address
the deficient performance of staff; or (4) a failure to discipline employees for not following
written policy.75 Liability arises where (1) a county employee violated the plaintiffs rights,
(2) the county's omission amounted to deliberate indifference, and (3) the omission was a
moving force behind the employee violating the plaintiffs rights. 76 The county's failure to act
.
. 77
genera11y presents a Jury questIOn.

Bennett v. City o/Slidell, 735 F.2d 861,862 (5 th Cir. 1984).
74 Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir.) (deliberate indifference shown by repeated
examples of negligent acts which disclose a pattern of conduct by the prison medical staft), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981) (citing Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48,52 (2 nd Cir. 1977)); Turpin v.
Mailet, 619 F.2d 196, 201-02 (2 nd Cir. 1980) ("'a single, unusually brutal or egregious beating
administered by a group of municipal employees may be sufficiently out of the ordinary to
warrant an inference that it was attributable to inadequate training or supervision amounting to
deliberate indifference or "gross negligence" on the part of officials in charge").
75 City o/Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,389 (1989); Conn, 591 F.2d at 1102-5; Gibson,
290 F.3dat 1194; Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470,1478 (9 th Cir. 1992).
76 Canton, 489 U.S. at 388-91; Gibson, 290 F.3d 1194.
77 Oviatt, 954 F.2d at 1478.
73
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A municipality is deliberately indifferent when a policymaker's omission "is so obvious,
and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rightS:,78 'The need to act
may be obvious because any reasonable person would recognize the need.,,79
Deliberate indifference under an omission theory does not contain a subjective
component. 80 In training, adoption of sound policies, supervision and discipline cases, deliberate
indifference maybe established by a policymaker's gross negligence. 8l
B.

It Was Reversible Error To Grant Wroblewski Summary Judgment

The trial court erred in several ways when it granted Wroblewski summary judgment:
First, the trial court granted summary judgment on an issue not properly raised in his motion.
Second, the trial court mistakenly believed that § 1983 cases should be treated differently on
summary judgment than all other cases.

Third, the trial court misconstrued the record by

concluding that Wroblewski's suicide screening took place simultaneously with the social
worker's assessment.

Finally, the trial court applied an incorrect deliberate indifference

standard.

Canton, 489 U.S. at 390.
Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1195.
80 Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 841).
st
81 Hegarty v. Somerset County, 53 F.3d 1367, 1379-80 (1 Cir. 1995); Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d
196, 202 (2 nd Cir. 1980); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1081 (3 rd Cir.
1976); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381,385 (7th Cir. 1979); White v. Washington Public Power,
692 F.2d 1286,1289-90 (9 th Cir. 1982); Brooks v. Sheib, 813 F.2d 1191,1193 (lIth Cir. 1987);
see also Liability of Supervisory Officials and Governmental Entities for Having Failed to
Adequately Train, Supervise, or Control Individual Police Officers Who Violate Plaintiff's Civil
Rights Under 42 US.C.A. § 1983,70 A.L.R. Fed. 17 (originally published in 1984) and cases
cited therein.
78

79
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1. Standard of review on appeal of a grant of summary judgment.

This Court's review of an appeal from an order of summary judgment is de novo and it
applies the same standards used by the trial court. 82 A grant of summary judgment is warranted
where it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw.,,83 The facts must be liberally construed in favor of the
non-moving party.84 "The burden of proving the absence of an issue of material fact rests at
all times upon the moving party.,·S5
2. The trial court considered issues not properly raised.
The trial court erred by granting Wroblewski summary judgment on an issue not properly
raised or supported by his Restated Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court held that
even though Wroblewski was subjectively aware of Bradley's serious medical need, Wroblewski
could not be held liable under § 1983 because "he did not fail to adequately respond to that
need."S6 That issue was not properly raised or supported by the motion for summary judgment.
A trial court commits reversible error when it grants summary judgment on issues not
raised and supported in the motion for summary judgment. 87 A motion for summary judgment
"shall state with particularity the grounds therefor.,,88 "[I]f the movant does not challenge an

82 Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 394 (2008).
83 LR.C.P. 56(c).
84 Renzo v. Idaho State Dep 't, ofAgric., 149 Idaho 777, 779, 241 P.3d 950,952 (2010).
85 Blickenstaffv. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 577, 97 P.3d 439, 444 (2004) (emphasis added),
86 R. pp. 2346-47; compare with R. pp. 75-178,288-763, 818-91, 942-83, 1451-1540, 1668-69,
1672-96,2046-2197,2254-76,2308-14,2315-56; Tr. (12110110), 187:1-236:22.
87 Thomson v, Idaho Ins. Agency, 126 Idaho 527,530-531 (1994);
88 LR.C.P. 7(b)(1) (emphasis added).
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aspect of the nonmovanfs case in that party's motion, the nonmovant is not required to address it
at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings.,,89
Once a party satisfies the particularity requirement, the moving party must still carry its
"initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact" on the issues raised in
the motion. 9o

Otherwise, the nonmoving party has no burden to respond with supporting

evidence. 91
Here, Wroblewski's Restated Motion for Summary Judgment did not state any particular
grounds for summary judgment, and instead moved generally "upon the grounds and for the
reason that there are no genuine issues of fact and that the Defendants are entitled to judgment as
a matter oflaw.,,92 Wroblewski also did not prove the absence of a genuine issue of material fact
on any of the necessary elements of Ms. Hoagland case. 93
The closest Wroblewski came to raising the issue on which the trial court granted him
summary judgment was in his Reply Memorandum in Support of Restated Motion for Summary
Judgment and in his Rebuttal Memorandum in Support of Restated Motion for Summary
Judgment. 94 In the Reply memorandum, Wroblewski argued for the first time that he had not
been deliberately indifferent. 95 However, Wroblewski did not identify anything in the record

Thomson, 126 Idaho at 531.
90 Vreeken v. Lockwood Eng'g, B. v., 148 Idaho 89, 101 (2009); Esser Elec. v. Lost River
Ballistics Techs., Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 919 (2008).
91 Vreeken, 148 Idaho at 101; Thomson, 126 Idaho at 531.
92 R. p. 1668.
93 R. pp. 1672-96,2046-2197,2254-76,2308-12.
94 R. pp. 2254-76, 2308-12.
95 R. pp. 2254-76.
89
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showing an absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to that argument. 96 Wroblewski wrote:
Also, in the interest of efficiency, the "individual capacity" New
Defendants 97 will refrain from restating the events that transpired
during Mr. Munroe's last incarceration beginning September 28,
2008, since they have already been set forth in the May 28, 2010
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at pages 20
through 24, which is incorporated herein by reference. 98
Even if the trial court accepted this incorporation by reference, the record cited was insufficient
to meet the burden of raising an issue and proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact
as to any element of the case.

99

There was only a passing reference to Wroblewski on the pages referenced with no
citation to the record. IOO Wroblewski's affidavit and Johnson's affidavit were later cited on
pages 4 and 5 of the Reply memorandum, but the factual statements in the memorandum
misrepresented the affidavit testimony. 101
As for Wroblewski's Rebuttal memorandum, the only reference to whether Wroblewski
had responded adequately to Bradley's need was the following:
In addition to Plaintiffs failure to identify personal involvement of
the bulk of the Defendants in this matter, she has cited no facts
demonstrating that the remaining Defendants (Wroblewski and
Johnson) (i) subjectively knew Munroe would likely commit
suicide and (ii) intentionally disregarded the risk, as is required
under the deliberate indifference standard injail suicide cases. 102
R. p. 2272.
97 The Ada County Defendants were referred to as the "New Defendants" in the memorandum.
98 R. p. 2272.
99
See R. pp. 98-102.
100 R. p. 100.
101 R. pp. 82-83.
102 R. p. 2312.
96
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That bare statement is insufficient to shift the burden to Ms. Hoagland to respond since it was in
rebuttal and therefore untimely; and Wroblewski failed to support the assertion by presentation
of evidence showing an absence of a genuine issue of material fact on those issues.
Nevertheless, the trial court granted Wroblewski summary judgment based on its finding that
Wroblewski "was subjectively aware of a serious medical need, but that he did not fail to
adequately respond to that need:,103
Whether Wroblewski responded reasonably is certainly part of the deliberate indifference
inquiry, but that was not an issue raised in the Restated Motion for Summary Judgment. 104 In the
Memorandum in Support of Restated Motion for Summary Judgment, the Ada County
Defendants raised the following four issues, of which only the second applied to Wroblewski:
(i) the government entity and individuals acting in their "official
capacity" are not appropriate defendants in this lawsuit, (ii) the
individuals acting in their "individual capacity" are entitled to the
protections of immunities under federal law that precludes liability,
(iii) Hoagland improperly attempts to invent constitutional
standards that do not exist, and (iv) Hoagland has sought improper
damages. 105
As to the immunity issue, the argument was limited to two discrete questions: (1) whether
Ms. Hoagland had a constitutional right that was enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and if so,
(2) whether the law was sufficiently established at the time to have put Wroblewski on notice
that his actions violated that right. 106

103 R.
104 R.
105 R.
106 R.

pp. 2346-47.
p. 1668.
p. 1675.
pp. 1683-90.
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The qualified immunity argument was raised purely as a legal issue. The Ada County
Defendants argued that a parent of an adult child has no constitutionally protected interest in her
adult son' s death that would support a claim under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. I07 They also argued that
even if such a right existed, the law was not clearly established at the time of Bradley's death,
and therefore, Wroblewski would be entitled to qualified immunity. 108 The factual issue of
whether Wroblewski reasonably responded to a known need was not raised or argued, and it was
improper for the Court to rule on the issue.

3. The trial court applied an incorrect summary judgment standard.
The trial court erred by grafting an "additional element" onto the summary judgment
standard merely because this is a § 1983 claim.

l09

As is always the case at the summary judgment stage, when determining whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists, a trial court is bound to view the facts in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.IIO Here, however, the trial court mistakenly believed that
because this is a § 1983 case, it should be treated different! y than all other cases for summary
judgment purposes. In setting out the standard it applied to the summary judgment motion, the
trial court made the following incorrect conclusion oflaw:
Generally, liberal construction of the facts in favor of the nonmoving party requires the court to draw all reasonable factual
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. If reasonable people
could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences

See R. pp. 1672-96.
Id.
109 R. p. 2329.
110 Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530.

107
108
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from the evidence, the motion should be denied.
Summary judgment of § 1983 cases involves an additional
element of analysis. In § 1983 cases, plaintiff bears the burden of
proof on the Constitutional deprivation that underlies the claim,
and must come forward with sufficient evidence to create a
genuine issue of material fact to avoid summary judgment. III
The conclusion oflaw reached by the trial court tips LR.C.P. 56 on its head by placing the initial
burden of proof at the summary judgment stage on the wrong party.
The trial court cited McAllister v. Price I 12 for the idea that summary judgment in § 1983
cases involves "an additional element" requiring the plaintiff to prove a constitutional violation
irrespective of whether a defendant has properly raised the issue and whether reasonable people
could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the facts.113

However,

McAllister does not stand for that proposition, and to the extent that it does, McAllister is an
incorrect statement of the law.
In McAllister, the Seventh Circuit stated the summary judgment standards it applied in a
§ 1983 case:
We review de novo an appeal from a district court's denial of
summary judgment to a defendant who claims qualified immunity.
Baird v. Renbarger, 576 F.3d 340, 343-44 (7th Cir. 2009). We
construe the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party.
Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 2003). In a § 1983
case, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the constitutional
deprivation that underlies the claim, and thus must come forth with
sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact to
R. p. 2329 (case citations omitted; emphasis added).
112 615 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2010).
113 R. p. 2329.

III

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

27

avoid summary judgment. Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 583
(7th Cir. 2006).114
Having cited Johnson v. Snyder, the McAllister court may have inadvertently suggested that a

§ 1983 plaintiff has an additional burden on summary judgment. However, there are three
reasons that the trial court in this case should have rejected that suggestion. First, read correctly,

jVlcAllister merely states which party has the ultimate burden of proof in the case. Second, if
jVlcAllister did interject such a requirement, it did so without support in the law since nowhere in
the decision did the Johnson court impose such an "additional analysis."
The United States Supreme Court has disavowed treating § 1983 cases any differently
under the rules of civil procedure than other cases. In Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics

Intelligence & Coordination Unit,II5 the Court held that it was reversible error to subject § 1983
claims to heightened pleading standards.

II6

The Court explained that the liberal pleading rules of

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should not be applied any differently to § 1983
cases than to any other case. II7 By extension, there is no more reason to apply heightened
summary judgment standards to § 1983 cases under Idaho's Rules of Civil Procedure.

It is true that Ms. Hoagland has the ultimate burden of proof at trial, but that does not
mean that at the summary judgment stage she has an additional burden of proof. The trial court's
importation of an additional element of proof into the summary judgment standard was

114 McAllister, 615 F.3d at 88l.
lIS 507 U.S. 163, 168 (U.S. 1993).
1I6 I d.
117 !d.
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reversible error.

4. The trial court misread the record.
The trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Wroblewski based on a
misreading of the record. lI8 The trial court confused the timing of when the Jail's social worker
spoke with Bradley and when Wroblewski concluded that Bradley appeared to be at risk of
suicide. Because of the trial court's misunderstanding, it mistakenly believed that Wroblewski
reasonably relied on the social worker's assessment and thereby "did not fail to adequately
respond" to Bradley's serious medical need. I 19
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court initially set forth the events surrounding
Wroblewski's interaction with Bradley in a relatively accurate manner, making the following
findings of fact: (1) Wroblewski began the booking process with Bradley when (2) he was
interrupted by social worker Johnson who (3) then spoke with Bradley for several minutes and
left, (4) leaving Wroblewski to finish the booking of Bradley. 120 Consistent with the record, the
trial court found that Bradley answered "Yes" to the following questions in the suicide risk
screening that Wroblewski conducted during the booking process: (1) "Have you ever been in a

118 Compare R. pp. 2333-38, 2346-47 (1120111 Mem. Dec. & Order), with R. pp. 135-144,207379 (Overson Aff., "2-14, Ex. F (.pdf pp. 575-656) (Wroblewski Dep., 17:4-19:3, 19:10-19,
20:22-29:15,31:12-32:1,33:18-35:24,67:4-70:4, Ex. B (Wroblewski written statement), Ex. C
(Diagram), Ex. D (Aff. of Wroblewski), Ex. E (Booking Documents - Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 9091), Ex. F (Security Check Log), Ex. G (booking video), Ex. H (Jail Policy), Ex. I (Jail Policy),
Ex. J (Jail Policies), Ex. K (Intake Processing Policy), Ex. L (Jail Records», , 6, Ex. E (.pdf
pp. 393-94) (Investigative Report, pp. 12-13),2128-29,2131.
119
See R. pp. 2346-47.
120 R. pp. 2324-25.
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mental institution or had psychiatric careT'; (2) "Have you ever contemplated suicide?"; and

(3) "Are you now contemplating suicideT I21 The Court wrote the following: "A final question
on the questionnaire required Wroblewski to answer: 'Does the inmate's behavior suggest a risk
of suicide?' Wroblewski responded 'yes.'" 122
Despite the relative accuracy of the trial court's findings earlier in its Memorandum
Decision, when the trial court assessed the individual liability of Wroblewski, it collapsed the
portion of the timeline during which Johnson spoke to Bradley and when Wroblewski asked
Bradley the suicide screening questions. 123 In that section of its Memorandum Decision, the trial
court wrote the following:
As Wroblewski was asking Munroe about thoughts of and
history of suicide, Psychiatric Social Worker James Johnson
arrived to discuss the same topics. Johnson completed his
assessment before Wroblewski completed the booking process.
When the booking was finished, it was not clear to Wroblewski
that he still needed to call the HSU, because he had actual
knowledge that Munroe had been simultaneously assessed by
HSU. Wroblewski knew that James Johnson or someone in
Johnson's department was the proper party to receive Munroe's
intake form. However, Wroblewski also knew that Johnson had
If Wroblewski had followed
already interviewed Munroe.
procedure, he would have re-informed the HSU. However, he was
new on the job and, more importantly, in his judgment Munroe had
received the assessment that was required.
Additionally,
Wroblewski's trainer was present and did not indicate to
Wroblewski that [sic] needed to follow Up.124

121 R. p. 2325.
!d.
123 R. p. 2346, L. 4-24.
124 R. p. 2346, L. 14-24 (emphasis added).
122
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On that basis, the trial court granted Wroblewski summary judgment, finding that he did not
· d equateIy. 125
respon d ma
In reaching its conclusions, the trial court misconstrued the record in several respects.
Most importantly, the trial court failed to recognize that Wroblewski did not start asking Bradley
about suicide until approximately 20 minutes after social worker Johnson left the area. 126 At
8:00 a.m., Wroblewski started fingerprinting Bradley.127

At 8:01 a.m., Johnson arrived and

spoke with Bradley until 8:04 a.m., at which time Johnson left the area. 128 While Johnson spoke
with Bradley, Wroblewski continued to fingerprint Bradley. 129
..
fimgerpnntmg
process at 8 :05 a.m. 130

Wroblewski finished the

From 8:06 a.m. to 8:34 a.m., Bradley placed four

telephone calls from the Jail.l3l Sometime after that, Wroblewski put Bradley into a different
office and started asking Bradley the questions on the intake health questionnaire. 132
During the questioning process, Wroblewski noted that Bradley's appearance was "poor"

125 R. p. 2347, L. 1-15.
126 R. pp. 135-140,2073-77 (Overson Aff." 8, Ex. F (.pdfpp. 577-82, 584-86, 590-91, 598-604,
621-23,650-51) (Wroblewski Dep., 17:4-19:3,19:10-19,20:22-29:15, 31:12-32:1, 33:18-35:24,
45:17-51:4,67:4-70:4, Exs. B, G-F, L)), 2128-29, 2131.
127 R. p.2075 (Overson Aff.,
(.pdf pp. 582-84, 590-91, 598-610, 623) (Wroblewski
Dep., 37:10-45:16, 67:4-70:4, Exs. B-E, G)).
128 Id.; see also R. pp. 183-87.
129 R. pp. 183-87, 2075 (Overson Aff., , 8, Ex. F (.pdf pp. 582-84, 590-91, 598-610, 623)
(Wroblewski Dep., 37:10-45:16, 67:4-70:4, Exs. B-E, G)).
130

Id.

131 R. pp. 729-30, 1398-1407, 2074 (Overson Aff., ,~ 2, 5, Ex. A (.pdf pp. 10, 60) (Robertson
Dep., Ex. D), ~ 6, Ex. E (.pdfpp. 389-90) (Investigative Report, pp. 8-9)).
132 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff., ~ 8, Ex. F (.pdf pp. 583-84, 590-91, 598-610, 623) (Wroblewski
Dep., 40:9-14, 44:23-45:16, 67:4-70:4, Exs. B-E, G)).
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and he looked sick, smelled of alcohol and appeared to be under the influence of alcoho1. 133
Bradley told Wroblewski he had been on Celexa, which is a common antidepressant. 134 During
the questioning, Bradley told Wroblewski he was seeing visions (,'Shadow People") and hearing
voices telling him to run; that he had been hospitalized recently in a mental health institution for
psychiatric care; that he had contemplated suicide; and that he had attempted suicide in the
past. 135 Bradley answered "Yes" when Wroblewski asked him the question, "Are you now
contemplating suicideT 136
Wroblewski answered "Yes" to the question, "Does the inmate's behavior suggest a
risk of suicide?,,137 At the time of the interview with Bradley, Wroblewski understood that it
was Jail policy that if the answers to the suicide questions were "yes" the officer must contact the
medical unit. 138 Despite "yes" answers to the most important suicide questions, Wroblewski
told no one that Bradley appeared to be at risk of committing suicide, and took no action to
abate the risk. 139
The trial court clearly misunderstood the record and believed that Wroblewski questioned

133 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff,
(.pdfpp. 586,606-10) (Wroblewski Dep., 51:7-52:25,
Ex. E».
134 !d.
135 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff,
(.pdfpp. 588-89, 606-10) (Wroblewski Dep., 59:1-63:17,
Ex. E».
136 R. p.2075 (Overson Aff., ~ 8, Ex. F (.pdf pp. 586, 606-10) (Wroblewski Dep., 53:18-20,
Ex. E».
137 R. p.2075 (Overson Aff, ~ 8, Ex. F (.pdf pp. 589, 606-10) (Wroblewski Dep., 65:1-6,
Ex. E».
138 R. p.2075 (Overson Aff.,
(.pdf pp. 591, 624-48) (Wroblewski Dep., 70:19-73:8,
Exs. H-K»; see R. pp. 2896-2900 for testimony of how the policies worked in practice.
139 Id.
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Bradley simultaneously with Johnson's assessment of Bradley. The trial court's mistake of fact
led to its conclusion that Wroblewski's conduct was mere negligence. When the record is read
correctly and the facts are construed in a light most favorable to Ms. Hoagland, it is clear that
summary judgment should have been denied.

A reasonable jury could have found that

Wroblewski's failure to alert anyone that Bradley had answered "yes" to the most important
suicide questions while Wroblewski himself concluded that Bradley appeared to be at risk of
suicide, amounted to deliberate indifference.
In addition to the trial court's misunderstanding of the events surrounding Bradley being
assessed for suicide risk, the trial court also misunderstood the extent of Wroblewski's training
and his understanding of the Jail's suicide risk prevention policies. The trial court emphasized
the fact that Wroblewski was in his last week of training at the Jail when he interacted with
Bradley. 140

The trial court failed to consider that Wroblewski had worked at the Idaho

Department of Correction in a maximum security facility prior to working at the Jail, and had
training in suicide reduction during that period. 141

The trial court discounted the fact that

Wroblewski had been through POST twice and received suicide prevention training on both
occasions. 142

The trial court also failed to recognize that Wroblewski admitted that he

understood the Jail's policies on suicide reduction on September 29, 2008, prior to Bradley's
death; and he knew what actions were required of him when the suicide questions were answered

R. pp. 2346-47.
141 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff., ~ 8, Ex. F (.pdfp. 575) (Wroblewski Oep., 7:9-8:16).
142 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff., ~ 8, Ex. F (.pdfpp. 575-76) (Wroblewski Oep., 9:13-10:22).
140
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in the affirmative. 143
The trial court incorrectly perceived Wroblewski as an inexperienced security officer
who was conducting his duties under the direct supervision of a trainer who also knew that the
suicide questions were answered in the affirmative. In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court
wrote, "Additionally, Wroblewski's trainer was present and did not indicate to Wroblewski that
[sic] needed to follow Up.,,144 But there was no evidence in the record for that finding. 145
The trial court clearly erred in its determination that while "Wroblewski was subjectively
aware of a serious medical need, he did not fail to adequately respond to that need.,,146 The error
arose from misreading the record. A correct reading of the record demonstrates that a genuine
issue of material fact existed that should have precluded summary judgment.

5. The trial court applied the wrong defmition of deliberate indifference.
The trial court applied the wrong definition of deliberate indifference to Ms. Hoagland's
claims. 147 The trial court defined deliberate indifference as follows: "For individual capacity
defendants, it must be shown that the defendant: (1) subjectively knew the prisoner was at
substantial risk of committing suicide and (2) intentionally disregarded the risk:,148 The trial
court's definition imposed on Ms. Hoagland a significantly higher standard of proof than the law

143 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff.,,-r 8, Ex. F (.pdfpp. 577, 592-94, 624-48) (Wroblewski Dep., 14:1424,15:16-16:12,75:17-85:25, Exs. H-K)).
144 R. p. 2346, L. 23-24.
145 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff.,,-r 8, Ex. F (.pdfp. 576) (Wroblewski Dep., 10:23-12:1).
146 R. p. 2347.
147 R. p. 2330.
148 Id. (emphasis added).
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reqUlres.
Within the jail suicide context, a jail official may be held liable for a detainee's suicide
when the official (1) knew the detainee faced a substantial risk of serious self-harm, and
(2) disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.

149

The second prong

of the deliberate indifference standard is one of reasonableness and does not require the plaintiff
to prove that the defendant acted intentionally to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional
rights. 150
The trial court committed reversible error when it applied an intentional standard to
Ms. Hoagland's claims and thereby found that Wroblewski was not liable under the second
prong of the deliberate indifference requirement. By applying the more rigorous intentional
standard, the trial court incorrectly dismissed Wroblewski because "he did not fail to adequately
respond.,·15l Had the trial court applied the correct definition of deliberate indifference, it would
have by necessity found that a genuine issue of material fact existed that precluded summary

149 Bowen v. City of Manchester, 966 F.2d 13, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1992); Colburn v. Upper Darby
Township, 946 F.2d 1017 (3 rd Cir. 1991); Short v. Smoot, 436 F.3d 422, 429 (4 th Cir. 2006);
Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386, 392, 394 (5 th Cir. 1992) (Goldberg concurring); Jaco
v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239, 244-45 (6 th Cir. 1984); Bradich ex rei. Estate of Bradich v. City of
Chicago, 413 F.3d 688, 690-92 (7th Cir. 2005); Wever v. Lincoln County, 388 F.3d 601,605-6
(8 th Cir. 2004); Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1244 (9 th Cir. 2010); Conn
v. City 0/ Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1096-1098 (9 th Cir. Nev. 2010); Cabrales v. County of Los
Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454 (9 th Cir.), judgment vacated by 490 U.S. 1087 for further consideration
in light of City o/Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), and judgment reinstated by 886
F.2d 235, cert. denied 494 U.S. 1091 (1990); Barrie v. Grand County, Utah, 119 F.3d 862, 865
(10th Cir. 1997); Snow ex ref. Snow v. City of Citronelle, AL, 420 F .3d 1262, 1268 (11 th Cir.
2005); Dorman v. District of Columbia, 888 F.2d 159,162 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
150 Farmer, 511 U.S. 847.
15l R. p. 2347.
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judgment.

6. Conclusion.
There are multiple independent grounds upon which this Court should reverse the trial
court's grant of summary judgment to Wroblewski. First, the trial court granted Wroblewski's
motion for summary judgment on an issue not properly raised and supported by his motion.
Second, the trial court placed a heightened burden on Ms. Hoagland based on the mistaken belief
that § 1983 cases should be treated differently at the summary judgment stage than all other
cases. Third, the trial court misconstrued the record by concluding that Wroblewski's suicide
screening took place simultaneously with Johnson's assessment of Bradley. Finally, the trial
court applied the wrong deliberate indifference standard.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse and remand for trial.

C.

James Johnson Is Not Entitled To Qualified Immunity
The trial court granted social worker Johnson summary judgment on the basis of

qualified immunity.152 Specifically, the trial court ruled as follows:
In Summary, while the facts as Ms. Hoagland has alleged them
may make out a violation by Johnson of a constitutional right, the
Court finds that a reasonable jail social worker would not have
thought he was acting with deliberate indifference toward Munroe
on September 29, 2008, by clearing Munroe from suicide watch,
and therefore, the right Hoagland alleges was violated was not
clearly established at that time. 153
The trial court erred in several respects in its March 28, 2011 order granting Johnson summary

152 R. p. 3499.
153 d.
I
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judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. First, the trial court incorrectly found as a matter
of law that even though Johnson knew Bradley was at risk of serious harm and took no
reasonable action to abate that risk, under like circumstances a reasonable social worker would
not know that such inaction was in violation of the Constitution.

Second, the trial court

incorrectly applied an analysis that confused the reasonable-notice standard for qualified
immunity with the reasonableness standard for determining when the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution has been violated. Third, the trial court erred by viewing the facts in a
light most favorable to Johnson's claim of qualified immunity by resolving conflicting expert
testimony, making credibility determinations, and accepting Johnson's self-serving testimony at
face value.
1. Johnson violated clearly established constitutional rights and is therefore not
entitled to qualified immunity.

Johnson is not entitled to qualified immunity because he violated Bradley's clearly
established constitutional rights.

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from liability

where a clearly established constitutional right has been violated. 154

Where "officers are on

notice that their conduct is unlawful" qualified immunity is not available as a defense. 155
Qualified immunity is only available where the official's action was objectively reasonable as
"assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.,,156

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982).
1-5
) Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002).
156 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19; Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856, 865 (2011).
154
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There is no subjective element to the clearly-established-law prong of the analysis.

15

?

It is a

purely objective standard. 158
"For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours must be sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.,,159
This is not to say, of course, that the single warning standard points
to a single level of specificity sufficient in every instance. In some
circumstances, as when an earlier case expressly leaves open
whether a general rule applies to the particular type of conduct at
issue, a very high degree of prior factual particularity may be
necessary. But general statements of the law are not inherently
incapable of giving fair and clear warning, and in other instances a
general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law
may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question,
even though "the very action in question has [not] previously been
held unlawful." 160
A court must look to its own and all other relevant precedents when determining whether the law
is clearly established. 161
Whether the law is clearly established is a question of law to be resolved de novo on
appeal. 162

Whether the official's conduct violated a clearly established right is question of

fact. 163 The factual record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 164

1-7

) Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19.
th
158 !d. at 812; Houghton v. South, 965 Fold 1532, 1534 (9 Cir. 1992).
159 Hope, 536 U.S. at 739-40.
16° Id. at 740-741 (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,263 (1997)).
161 Miller, 150 Idaho at 865; see Elderv. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994).
162 Miller, 150 Idaho at 865.
163 Ortiz v. Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884, 889 (2011); see also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 318-320
(U.S. 1995) (where genuine material issue of fact exists as to the officer's conduct, a denial of
qualified immunity is not appealable).
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a. Bradley's clearly established constitutional rights.

Johnson's conduct violated Bradley's clearly established rights.

The contours of

Bradley's right to health and safety were well established by many cases holding that a jailer
violates a detainee's constitutional rights when he knows the detainee faces a substantial risk of
self-harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to prevent the harm. 165
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied qualified immunity to a prison psychologist on
facts similar to those in this case.

In Comstock v. McCrary, the defendant psychologist

"reevaluated" the prisoner "briefly" by speaking to him for 30 minutes and then removing the
prisoner from suicide status based on the face value of the prisoner's statement that he was no
longer suicidal. 166

The defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that "he did not

perceive that there was a substantial risk of harm" to the inmate and that he was entitled to
qualified immunity because he had used reasonable medical judgment to reach that
conclusion. 167 The Court found that there were sufficient facts to find the defendant had been
deliberately indifferent by performing a "cursory evaluation" and denied the defendant's motion

Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319; compare Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,201 (2001) (Taken in the
light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's
conduct violated a constitutional right?") with Nation v. State, 144 Idaho 177, 187 (2007) ("First,
taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting immunity, did the alleged conduct violate
a constitutional right?')
165 See supra notes 61, 149; see also 60 Am. Jur. 2d PENAL AND CORRECTIONAL Etc. § 207
(Suicide) (2008) (cataloging cases that hold that a jail official violates an inmate's constitutional
rights when the official is deliberately indifferent to the serious risk of suicide); Civil liability of
prison or jail authorities for self-inflicted injury or death of prisoner, 79 A.L.R.3d 1210
(Originally published in 1977) (same).
166
273 F.3d 693,699-700 (6 th Cir. 2002).
167 !d. at 700.
164
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for summary judgment. 168

The Court made its decision based on the defendant's brief

evaluation, failure to review the prisoner's records, failure to check log books kept by the control
center, and failure to complete a written health record prior to taking the inmate off suicide
status. 169 The Court also looked to the experts' testimony that the defendanfs conduct was
"grossly substandard.,,17o The Court then turned to the question of whether clearly established
law existed at the time to put the defendant on notice that his conduct was unconstitutional. 171
The Court concluded that "a reasonable prison psychologist in 1995 'would have clearly
understood that [he] was under an affinnative duty' to offer reasonable medical care to a prisoner
whom he knew to be suicidal, in the circumstances confronted by him.,,172
Here, the trial court found that Johnson knew of the serious risk of hann faced by
Bradley, and failed to take the appropriate actions to alleviate that risk. 173 That was a correct
finding. Where the trial court erred was by concluding as a matter of law that a reasonable social
worker in Johnson's circumstances would not be on notice in light of then existing law that his
inaction was unconstitutional. 174 Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, the law was abundantly
clear by September 29, 2008, that if a jail social worker knows an inmate is at risk of self-harm,
the United States Constitution imposes an affinnative duty to take reasonable steps to abate the

Id. at 704,
Id. at 703-04.
170 Id. at 708-11.
171 !d. at 711.
172 Id. (citation omitted).
173 R. pp. 2347-50; 3494-99.
174 R. pp. 3498-99,
168

169
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risk. l75 Johnson knew "that this guy was planning and wanting to hurt himself."

l76

It is simply

inconceivable that a reasonable social worker in Johnson's circumstances would not know that
the failure to take reasonable action to protect Bradley was a constitutional violation.

l77

The

Comstock case along with all of the other suicide cases from around the country served as fair
notice to anyone in Johnson's situation that a failure to act was unconstitutional.

b. Ms. Hoagland's clearly established constitutional rights.
Johnson's conduct violated the clearly established rights of Ms. Hoagland. The contours
of Ms. Hoagland's rights in her familial relationship with her son were sufficiently established
by the existence of numerous cases where parents of adult children, and other similar familial
relationships, were found to have had a constitutionally protected familial interest that was
invaded by a jailer's deliberate indifference toward a prisoner. l78

IT

) See supra note 165.
R. pp. 2695.
l77 The record amply supports a finding that Johnson knew Bradley faced a serious risk of selfinjury. See R. pp. 131-44, 148-50, 151-54, 159-69, 290-93 (Overson Aff., ~~ 25-29, 33-34, 62,
Exs. 13-17,23),1402-5 (Overson Aff., ~~ 15-19,25),1437-40 (Overson Aff., ~ 2, Ex. A (video
CD)), 2073-77 (Overson Aff., ~~2-14, Ex. A (.pdfpp. 6-14,21-79) (Robertson Dep., pp. 17:141 :20, Exs. B-D), ~ 5, Ex. D (.pdf pp. 207-308) (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 1-176), ~ 6, Ex. E (.pdf
pp. 347-48, 357-63, 381-95) (Investigative Report pp. 3, 8-10, 12-13 & MedicalSOP 1-2, 81-2,
105-11), ~ 8, Ex. F (.pdf pp. 577-82, 590-91, 598-604, 623, 650-51) (Wroblewski Dep., 17:419:3, 19:10-19,20:22-29:15, 31:12-32:1, 33:18-35:24, 39:1-24, 41:11-45:15, 59:2-22, 60:1770:4, Ex. B (statement), Ex. G (video CD), Ex. L (Security Log)), ~ 9, Ex. G (.pdfpp. 670, 673)
(Defs' 5th Supp. Resp. 22, 25), 2080-90, 2091-2197, 2626-28 (Overson Aff., ~13ea), Ex. 11
(video CD), ~ Bee), Ex. 13 (video CD), ~ 14, Ex. 15 (Ex. PP-Jail Cell Photos; Ex. QQ-Arm
Photo)), 2631-2702, 3012-30.
nd
178 McFadden v. Sanchez, 710 F.2d 907 (2
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983); Brazier v.
Cherry, 293 F.2d 402 (5 th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961); Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d
239 (6 th Cir. 1984); Bass v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1985); Bell v. City a/Milwaukee,
746 F.2d 1205, 1234-41 (7th Cir. 1984); Trujillo v. Board o/County Commissioners o/Santa Fe,
176
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The Ninth Circuit, in Strandberg v. City of Helena, held that parents of a 22-year-old who
hung himself in jail could proceed with a § 1983 action against jail officials for a Fourteenth
Amendment violation. 179 That case was decided in 1982 and thus provided ample notice that
conduct such as Johnson's violates the Constitution.
Johnson also had notice that he could be sued under § 1983 by Bradley's heirs because
the law was clear that § 1988 would be read to incorporate Idaho's wrongful death and
survivorship statutes in order to provide an adult child's parent with standing to sue under § 1983
for a constitutional violation resulting in the child's death.I80 Clearly established law in 2008
was that I.C. §§ 5-311, 5-327 and 15-1-201 provided Ms. Hoagland standing to bring her
claims. 181 Since at least 1908, this Court has recognized loss of society and companionship as an
element of damages in a wrongful death case, and since then, this Court has read § 5-311 (1)
expansively to recognize a presumption of loss of companionship damages in certain wrongful

768 F.2d 1186, 1189 (loth Cir. 1985); Banks v. Yokemich, 177 F. Supp. 2d 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
Garcia v. Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. 230 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Williams v. Oakland, 915 F. Supp.
1074 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Tracy v. Bittles, 820 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ind. 1993); Davis v. City of
Ellenburg, 651 F. Supp. 1248 (E.D. Wa. 1987); Heath v. City of Hialeah, 560 F. Supp. 840 (S.D.
Fla. 1983); White v. Talboys, 573 F. Supp. 49 (D. Colo. 1983); Sager v. City of Woodland Park,
543 F. Supp. 282, 297 (D. Colo. 1982); Larson v. Wind, 542 F. Supp. 25, 27 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
th
179 791 F.2d 744, 748 (1986); see also Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411 (9 Cir. 1987)
(recognizing familial due process interest of adult children in parent's life); Curnow v.
Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321,325 (9 th Cir. 1991) (parents and children have liberty interest in
familial relationship with decedent).
180 Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 216-18 (1990); Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973
F.2d 386,391-92 (5 th Cir. 1992).
181 See infra Part III.F.l.
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death cases. 182 Johnson had notice that he could be sued by a parent for his conduct.
Irrespective of whether the law was clear regarding the constitutional rights of a parent,
when a personal representative or heir makes a § 1983 claim for the decedent's death, the
substantive rights at issue for qualified immunity purposes are those of the decedent. 183 Here,
any reasonable jail social worker faced with the circumstances confronted by Johnson, who knew
that a detainee was at risk of suicide, would be on fair notice that a failure to act in order to abate
that risk violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
2. The trial court confused "reasonableness" under the qualified immunity
standard with "reasonableness" under the Fourth Amendment standard.

The trial court erred when it inappropriately applied the reasonableness standard from
Fourth Amendment cases to the qualified immunity analysis in this Fourteenth Amendment
claim. 184

Qualified immunity will shield officials who violate the Constitution under

circumstances in which a reasonable person would not, under similar conditions and in light of
existing law, have fair notice that they were violating someone's constitutional rights. 185

18')

- Anderson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 15 Idaho 513, 99 P. 91, 93 (1908); Sawyer v. Claar, 115
Idaho 322, 326 (1988); Horner v. Sani-Top, Inc., 143 Idaho 230, 237 (2006).
th
183 Rhyne, 973 F.2d at 391-92; Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1063-64 (8 Cir. 2001); Toguchi
th
v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9 Cir. 2004); Lee v. City 0/ Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,685-86
(9 th Cir. 2001); Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dept., 159 F.3d 365, 371 (9 th Cir. 1998);
Byrd v. Guess, 137 F.3d 1126, 1134 (9 th Cir. 1998); Ward v. City o/San Jose, 967 F.2d 280, 283
(9 th Cir. 1992); Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9 th Cir. 1991); Smith v. City 0/
Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1419 (9 th Cir. 1987); Berry v. City o/Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1504-5
(10 th Cir. 1990); Robertson v. Hecksel, 420 F.3d 1254 (11 th Cir. 2005); Rentz v. Spokane County,
438 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (E.D. Wa. 2006).
184 R. pp. 3498-99.
185 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,203 (2001).
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The reasonableness standard for searches under the Fourth Amendment and the
reasonableness standard under the qualified immunity inquiry are distinctly different. 186 Many
courts confused the two standards for years until the United States Supreme Court in Saucier v.
Katz expressly held that they are two different inquiries. 187 The reasonableness inquiry for

Fourth Amendment purposes is whether a search or seizure was a reasonable invasion of a
person's privacy.188

The inquiry for qualified immunity purposes is whether a reasonable

person, in light of existing law and under similar circumstances, would be on notice that they
were violating the law. 189 While it may be a confusing distinction to make in the context of
Fourth Amendment cases, such confusion should not arise in cases like this one where the officer
knows the risk faced by the detainee of self-harm. 190 In light of the long-standing law, no person
with such knowledge can reasonably claim not to realize the constitutional duty to act.
The trial court in this case unfortunately applied the reasonableness standard of the
Fourth Amendment to the qualified immunity analysis in this case, and thereby erred as a matter
oflaw when it found that Johnson was entitled to qualified immunity.
3. The trial court viewed the facts in the wrong light.

The trial court erred by viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Johnson's claim of

Id.
187 !d. at 201-07.
188 !d.
189 d.
I
190 See Short v. Smoot, 436 F.3d 422, 429 (4th Cir. 2006) ("'record permitted a reasonable
inference that Ferguson knew Short was attempting to commit suicide" foreclosing summary
judgment).
186
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qualified immunity when it resolved conflicting expert testimony, made credibility
determinations, and accepted Johnson's self-serving testimony at face value. 191 The errors may
have been due to the reliance on this Court's decision in Nation v. State, where it was said that
the first question in qualified immunity analysis is whether "taken in the light most favorable to
the party asserting immunity, did the alleged conduct violate a constitutional rightT I92 This
Court cited Saucier v. Katz, but Saucier held just the opposite, writing that the first question of
qualified immunity is whether "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the
injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional rightT I93 This
Court should take this opportunity to expressly overrule that portion of the opinion in Nation that
is inconsistent with the direction given in Saucier to view the facts in a light most favorable to
the nonmoving party.
It appears the trial court followed Nation's direction in its qualified immunity analysis.
While the trial court recognized that there was conflicting expert testimony,194 it went on to
resolve the conflict in Johnson's favor by discounting the expert testimony of Dr. White,
Dr. Metzner, and Social Worker PowelL I95

Dr. White's affidavit explained that Johnson's

conduct fell far below the standard for correctional suicide assessment. 196 Dr. Metzner provided

191 R. pp. 3494-99.
192 144 Idaho 177, 187 (2007).
193 Nation, 144 Idaho at 187 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. 194,201 (2001)).
194 R. p. 3398.
195 See R. pp. 3491-99.
196 R. pp. 2120, 3012-30.
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a similar affidavit. 197 Social Worker Powell also provided an affidavit testifying that Johnson's
conduct was an extreme deviation from the standard of care for social workers performing
suicide assessments. 198 The trial court erred by discounting each of these experts' testimony
regarding the standards of practice in their respective fields of expertise.
The trial court also made credibility determinations, though not expressly, by accepting
Johnson's self-serving testimony and the testimony of the Ada County Defendants' other
witnesses at face value. The trial court accepted Johnson's testimony at face value regarding the
thought process that he went through on the morning of September 29,2008, when he spoke with
Bradley.199 Johnson claimed that he exercised reasonable clinical judgment and was therefore
entitled to qualified immunity, but that claim is severely undermined by his own testimony and
the testimony of Wroblewski. 2oo Johnson testified first that Bradley was not on suicide watch,
and then he testified that he was on suicide watch. 20 I

Johnson could not have exercised

reasonable clinical judgment without first determining Bradley's then current status.
Significant conflicts also exist between Johnson's testimony and the testimony of other
witnesses. For instance, Johnson claimed that one reason he did not re-assess Bradley after

197 R.p.20 91 .
198 R. pp. 2080-90.
199 R. pp. 3494-99.
200 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff., ~ 8, Ex. F (.pdf pp. 582-84, 588-90) (Wroblewski Dep., 39:1-24,
41:11-45:15,59:2-22,60:17-67:3)).
201 Compare R. p. 2693 with p. 2678 (Johnson Dep., 246:18-20 ("Bradley, who I had met with
and cleared from suicide watch, ... :') and with 186:20-189:2 (denying knowledge that Bradley
was on suicide watch when Johnson met with him) and 195:12-197:17 (testimony relating to
documentation of Johnson taking Bradley off suicide watch).
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Robertson told him that Bradley had threatened suicide over the phone that morning from the
J ail, was that he had just seen Bradley.202 However, Johnson' s time1ine is not consistent with the
testimony of Robertson or Jail records. According to Robertson, she conveyed the information
to Johnson in very specific terms shortly before 10:37 a.m. 203 The record is not disputed that
Johnson was finished with Bradley just minutes after 8:00 a.m?04
A conflict exists between Johnson's description of Bradley's demeanor when he spoke to
Bradley, and the description provided by Wroblewski.

Johnson described Bradley as being

relaxed, calm, comfortable, speaking clearly, pleasant, not angry, respectful, and cooperative. 2os
Wroblewski described Bradley as being in poor physical condition, under the influence of
alcohol, smelling of alcohol, annoyed, angry, hearing voices in his head, seeing shadow people,
confused, talking about committing suicide, and behaving in a manner that suggested Bradley
was at risk of suicide. 206
In audio recordings of the telephone calls Bradley made to Catherine Saucier on the
morning of September 29, 2008, shortly after Johnson spoke to Bradley, Bradley made

20-7 R. p. 139.
203 R. p. 2074 (Overson AfT., '2, Ex. A (.pdfpp. 7-10) (Robertson Dep., 19:16-20:1,24:1-30:19,
Ex. C (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 00127)), 2659-93 (Johnson Dep., 112:18-115:5, 226:14-227:6,
248: 10-12).
204 R. pp. 1437 (Overson Aff., Ex. A) (video CD), 2074-75 (Overson Afr., , 2, Ex. A (.pdfpp. 710, 25-51) (Robertson Dep., 19:16-20:1, 24:1-30:19, Ex. C); 2659-60, 2688, 2693 (Johnson
Dep., 112:18-115:5,226:14-227:6,248:10-12).
205 R. p. 2666 (Johnson Dep., 137:9-138:16, 179:7-23).
206 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff., , 8, Ex. F (.pdf pp. 582-84, 588-90) (Wroblewski Dep., 39:1-24,
41:11-45:15,59:2-22,60:17-67:3)).
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statements that contradict Johnson's description of Bradley's demeanor that morning. 207 Bradley
stated that the only drug he wanted was Thorazine (a powerful antipsychotic medication).208
Most unsettling is that Bradley stated that he thought he should kill himself?09 The telephone
calls clearly contradict Johnson's description of Bradley's mood and apparent state of mind.
The biggest reason the trial court should not have accepted Johnson's claim of having
used reasonable judgment is because Johnson testified that he knew Bradley had made multiple
attempts at suicide by which Bradley intended, planned, and wanted to hurt himself 210 Johnson
documented Bradley's suicidal intent, and by his own testimony, when Johnson uses the term
"intent" it means "Intent to hurt yourself, you know, I knew that there was a serious element. ,,2 I I
[JOHNSON:] And intent, actually, tends to carry a lot. When I
use the word "intent;' you actually know that I have a high level of
concern about that.
A. So I had a serious-you know, I understood the seriousness of
it. When you see my word "intent"-because, clearly, often
people with ideation don't require a higher level of observation in
the jail.
Because they say, you "These thoughts are entering my head, they
bother me, but, you know, I can manage them. I don't intend to
die. I'm not intending to hurt myself."
So intent-the fact that I wrote "intent" makes me-it may have
been even, actually, the wrong word.
Maybe I meant he
attempted? But just the fact irs there makes me know that I was
very clear that, you know, this guy-it's been serious in the past.
Q. SO I just want to make sure I understand. Suicidal ideation
207 R. p. 2074 (Overson Aff,,-r 6, Ex. E (.pdfpp. 389-91) (Investigative Report, pp. 8-9)).
Id.
209 See Id.
210 R. pp. 2691-92 (Johnson Dep., 240:14-242:17).
211Id.
208
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may be down here on the risk leveL And then intent, the next
level. AndA. Means, available means, method, and those kinds of things
andA. -you know, planned? Means, intent--or means, method, plan,
and then attempt, yeah, you're starting to arc way up into what you
consider increased risk. 212
In explaining what he meant when he used the specific term "intent" in his documentation of his
September 29, 2008 suicide assessment of Bradley, Johnson testified that he knew Bradley was
planning and wanting to hurt himself:
Intent to hurt yourself, you know, I knew that there was a serious
element. Whether I had that in my idea -- you know, in my idea
that he had actually also done the things that we know that he had
done, the overdose and the cutting -- I mean, intent actually -- I
know that this guy was planning and wanting to hurt
himself. 213
Given lohnson's testimony and the trial court's findings of fact, it is clear that the trial court did
not view the facts in a light most favorable to Ms. Hoagland.
The trial court was bound under LR.C.P. 56 and Article I, Section 7 of the Idaho
Constitution to view the facts in a light most favorable to Ms. Hoagland.

The LR.C.P. 56

requirement that a trial court view the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party is an
important safeguard of the right to trial by jury.214 Here, the trial court denied Ms. Hoagland her

212

Id.

213Id.

Schroeder v. Partin, 259 P.3d 617, 622 (2011) ("Only the jury may weigh evidence and
assess witness credibility"); Thomas v. Medical Ctr. Physicians, 138 Idaho 200, 205 (2002);
accord Thompson v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 664 F.3d 62 (5th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that summary
judgment may interfere with the right to jury trial under state law).
214
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right to a jury trial by viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Johnson. Had the trial court
properly viewed the facts in a light most favorable to Ms. Hoagland, it would have had to deny
Johnson's motion for summary judgment.
c

4. Conclusion
The trial court committed reversible error by finding that as a matter of law a government
official who knows a detainee is at risk of serious harm and fails to take reasonable action to
address that risk would not be on notice that such actions were in violation of a detainee's
constitutional rights; by finding that Johnson was entitled to qualified immunity based on the
reasonableness standard used to determine liability in Fourth Amendment cases; and by viewing
the facts in a light most favorable to Johnson's claim of qualified immunity. Each of these errors
is an independent basis for reversal, and this Court should reverse and remand for trial.

D.

The Trial Court Erred By Dismissing the Monell Claims Against Ada County
The trial court erred by granting summary judgment to all Ada County Defendants sued

in their official capacity despite the existence of genuine issues of material fact. 215 The affidavits
of Drs. White

216

and Metzner217 created genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Jail was

being operated within constitutional standards and whether unconstitutional customs and
practices were a moving force in Bradley's death. As set forth in each of their affidavits, there
were serious systemic problems with the manner in which healthcare was delivered to the

215
216
217

R. pp. 2323-38,3499-3501.
R. pp. 2120-97, 3012-30.
R. pp. 2091-2119.
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inmates at the Jai1.218 This was not a single instance of unconstitutional practice. 219
The trial court believed that Ms. Hoagland had to prove a "series of bad acts" in order to
prevail on her official capacity claims. 22o However, "a series of bad acts" is not the standard for
establishing municipal liability under § 1983.

The standard is that a plaintiff must show

deliberate indifference on an institutional scale, which Ms. Hoagland did with proof of repeated
examples of medical care denials and delays that bespeak a deliberate indifference:
While a single instance of medical care denied or delayed, viewed
in isolation, may appear to be the product of mere negligence,
repeated examples of such treatment bespeak a deliberate
indifference by prison authorities to the agony engendered by
haphazard and ill-conceived procedures. Indeed, it is well-settled
in this circuit that "a series of incidents closely related in time ...
may disclose a pattern of conduct amounting to deliberate
indifference to the medical needs of prisoners. ,,22 1
The trial court should have denied the Ada County Defendants' motion for summary
judgment because Ms. Hoagland showed by the affidavits of her experts that a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether the Jail had systemically failed to meet the healthcare needs of
its inmates and whether that failure was a moving force in Bradley's death. This Court should
reverse and remand.

218 R. pp. 2091-2197,3012-30.
I d.
220 R. pp. 2323-38, 3499-3501.
221 Krause v. Whitely, 985 F.2d 573 (9 th Cir. 1993) (Table) (quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d
559, 575 (10 th Cir.) (deliberate indifference may be shown by repeated examples of negligent
acts which disclose a pattern of conduct by the prison medical staff), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041
(1981)).
219
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E.

The Trial Court Erred By Dismissing Ms. Hoagland's Claims Against Kate Pape
The trial court erred by dismissing Kate Pape in her individual capacity under the wrong

legal standard. Ms. Hoagland's claim against Pape was that her failure to supervise, train and
enforce the written policies of the Jail's medical unit caused Bradley's death. The trial court
failed to understand that the supervisory claim against Pape did not require a showing of actual
knowledge. 222 A claim against a supervisor in an individual capacity can proceed on proof that
the supervisor "knew or should have known" that there was a high degree of risk that a
subordinate would violate someone's rights but "either deliberately or recklessly disregarded that
risk by failing to take action that a reasonable supervisor would find necessary to prevent such a
risk, and that failure caused a constitutional injury.,,223
Pape knew or should have known that her employees were not fulfilling their
constitutional duties toward inmates to provide adequate medical care. As Dr. White observed:
It seems clear that ACJ administrators did not meet their

obligations to provide necessary supervision or oversight required
to ensure adequate levels of performance or policy compliance.
The deficiencies exemplified in Mr. Munroe's case suggest critical
lack of reasonable quality control measures which was confirmed
by the withdrawal ofNCCHC accreditation, suggesting a pervasive
and repetitive pattern of indifference to policy compliance at ACJ.
In my judgment, Mr. Munroe's death was the direct result of the
cumulative effects of a cascading series of inadequate assessments
and treatment for his mental health needs. 224

222 R. p. 3502; for additional factual support, see R. pp. 3231-49 and record citations therein.
nd
223 Poe, 282 F.3d at 142; see also Provost v. City a/Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 155 (2 Cir. 2001)
(stating that there can be no liability for gross negligence absent evidence that a supervisor
"knew or should have known" about an illegality).
724
- R. p. 2135.
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Pape had actual knowledge of the widespread problems within the Jail medical unit by
the NCCHC revoking the Jail's certification before Bradley's death.225 Pape admitted running
the medical unit in an ad hoc manner irrespective of the written policies. 226 There were many
instances where employees of the medical unit did not know the policies of the Jail-Johnson
being one, since he was allowed to work as a social worker in an Idaho jail without a social work
license, and did not bother to familiarize himself with the operations of the Jai1.227
For these reasons, the trial court should not have granted summary judgment to Pape.
F.

The Trial Court Erred As A Matter Of Law By Dismissing Count I On The
Grounds That Bradley's § 1983 Cause Of Action Abated Upon His Death
The trial court erred as a matter of law by ruling that Ms. Hoagland cannot pursue a

§ 1983 action for the violation of Bradley's constitutional rightS. 228 In reaching its decision, the
trial court applied the analysis used by this Court in Evans v. Twin Falls County,229 and by the
United States Supreme Court in Robertson v. Wegmann,230 to determine whether Ms. Hoagland
had a claim for the violation of Bradley's constitutional rightS. 23l In Evans, this Court held that
where a decedent's death was not caused by the constitutional violation, a decedent's § 1983
claims abate upon the plaintiffs death. 232 Under Robertson, the United States Supreme Court

225 R. pp. 2091-2119, 2120-97, 2991-3011, 3012-30.
226 R. pp. 3104-05, 3112-14 (Pape Dep., 188:5-189:23,217:25-218:25; 223:14-225:l3).
227 R. pp. 2645-46, 2688-89 (Johnson Dep., 58:12-59:23, 227:14-229:15).
228 R. pp. 1541-1588, 2317-2322; for additional support in case development see R. pp. 17991805.
229 118 Idaho 210, 216-18 (1990),
230 436 U.S. 584, 588-90 (1978),
23l R. pp. 1541-88,2317-22.
232 1 18 Idaho at 218.
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held that where the decedent's death was not caused by the constitutional violations and the
personal representative of the decedent's estate did not have standing under Louisiana state law,
the decedent's § 1983 claim abated?33

1. Idaho's Probate Code provides Ms. Hoagland with standing to pursue a
survivorship and a wrongful death claim under § 1983.
The trial court erred by failing to recognize that Idaho's Probate Code gIVes
Ms. Hoagland standing to bring a survivorship and a wrongful death claim.

Ms. Hoagland

brought Count I of the Third Amertded Complaint as an heir and as the personal representative of
Bradley's estate which gave her standing to bring a survivorship claim pursuant to I.C. §§ 5311(2), 5-327, and 15-1-201(22).

Ms. Hoagland brought Count II of the Third Amended

Complaint in her individual capacity, but her standing to bring a wrongful death claim is
premised on her status as an heir and personal representative under I.C. § 5-311 and 15-1201(22).234 The trial court dismissed Ms. Hoagland's survivorship claim on the grounds that
under the analysis in Evans and Robertson, all of Bradley's § 1983 claims abated upon his death
irrespective of whether the constitutional violation caused his death.235
Under the Evans/Robertson analysis, if federal law does not provide for a necessary
substantive rule of law to be applied in a § 1983 action, the court is to determine whether state
law can provide an appropriate rule. 236 If state law is not inconsistent with the deterrent and

233 436 U.S. at 594-95.
234 See R. pp. 1522-38.
235 See R. pp. 1578-87.
236 Evans, 118 Idaho at 216-18; Robertson, 436 U.S. at 588-90; 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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compensatory purposes for which § 1983 was enacted, the court is to apply the state 1aw.

237

If

the state law is inconsistent with the policies of § 1983, the court may then fashion a rule that
satisfies those policies. 238 The trial court in this case erred in its application of the Evans/

Robertson analysis which has consistently been used to determine who can sue under § 1983
when the person whose rights were violated has died before judgment was entered or was killed
by the constitutional violation in question. 239
The trial court erred in this case because in cases where the defendant's wrongful conduct
causes death, § 1983' s policy purposes are not sufficiently advanced if the claim abates. The
trial court mistakenly applied the common law abatement rule that applies only to cases where
death is caused by something other than the defendant's conduct, such as in Evans and

Robertson. 24o The claim abated in Evans because there was no evidence that the defendant's
actions caused the plaintiff's death.24I The claim in Robertson abated because the state statute
did not identify personal representatives as having standing to pursue the claim when the plaintiff
died of unrelated causes. 242 Had the person substituting for the deceased plaintiff in Robertson
been a "spouse, children, parents, or siblings" instead of a personal representative, the claim
could have been pursued because under the applicable state law ..the action survives only in

Evans, 118 Idaho at 216-18; Robertson, 436 U.S. at 588-90.
238 Evans, 118 Idaho at 216-18; Robertson, 436 U.S. at 588-90.
239 See cases cited infra note 246.
740
- See Evans, 118 Idaho at 215 n. 5; Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592.
241 Id.
242 436 U.S. at 594.
237
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favor of a spouse, children, parents, or siblings.,,243 The Robertson case arose in Louisiana
which "does not allow the deceased's personal representative to be substituted as plaintifC

o244

Idaho law does. 245

2. A § 1983 claim does not abate where the wrong caused death.
Even if Idaho's statute did not provide for a survivorship claim, Count I of the Third
Amended Complaint still should not have been dismissed. The trial court erred by applying the
abatement rule without sufficient consideration for the fact that this case involved a death caused
by the violation of the decedent's constitutional rights. To fully effectuate the purpose of § 1983
(i. e., deterrence and compensation), the abatement rule cannot apply to cases where the
constitutional wrong caused a death. Numerous federal courts have so held. 246
A rule that abates all claims upon death has no place in the § 1983 context when the

cause of death is a constitutional wrong. The deterrence policies of § 1983 would be severely

!d. at 591.
I d.
245 See I.C. §§ 5-311(2),5-327, and 15-1-201(22).
h
246 See Bass v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173, 1189-90 (i Cir. 1985); Bell v. City of Milwaukee,
746 F.2d 1205, 1234-41 (7th Cir. 1984); Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239 (6 th Cir. 1984); Brazier v.
Cherry, 293 F.2d 402, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961); McFadden v. Sanchez, 710 F.2d 907
(2 nd Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983); Banks v. Yokemich, 177 F. Supp. 2d 239 (S.D.N.Y.
2001); Garcia v. Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. 230 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Williams v. Oakland, 915 F.
Supp. 1074 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Tracy v. Bittles, 820 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ind. 1993); Davis v. City
of Ellenburg, 651 F. Supp. 1248 (E.D. Wa. 1987); Heath v. City of Hialeah, 560 F. Supp. 840
(S.D. Fla. 1983); White v. Talboys, 573 F. Supp. 49 (D. Colo. 1983); Sager v. City of Woodland
Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 297 (D. Colo. 1982); Larson v. Wind, 542 F. Supp. 25, 27 (N.D. Ill.
1982); see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24 (1980) (in federal Bivens claim survived
death); Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1476 (9 th Cir.
1994) (wrongful death claims brought under international human rights laws survived death).
243
244
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undermined by application of such a rule where, as here, the serious harm likely to result from an
official's deliberate indifference is death. This is true of the entire class of constitutional claims
where a death results. Application of an abatement rule to the entire class of cases would serve
to have the opposite impact on official misconduct than § 1983 was intended to have. Instead of
deterrence, abatement of the claim would serve to create an incentive to ensure the direst
consequences of official misconduct. The purpose of § 1983 would be seriously undermined if
only those who survived illegally inflicted pain and suffering were able to enforce those rights.

3. Conclusion.
The trial court erred as a matter of law by dismissing Count I because survivorship claims
do not abate in Idaho.

However, should this Court hold that Idaho does not provide for a

survivorship claim, this Court should reject application of the abatement rule to § 1983 claims
where the wrong resulted in death. For the reasons stated, this Court should reverse and remand.

G.

The Trial Court Erred By Awarding $15,815.31 In Costs As A Matter Of Right
And $77,438.12 In Discretionary Costs
The trial court erred by awarding costs as a matter of right that are not allowed under

LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C), and by relieving the Ada County Defendants of their burden of proof when
awarding $77,438.12 in discretionary costs and not making express findings as to why each
specific item was a necessary and exceptional cost reasonably incurred and should, in the interest
of justice, be awarded. The award of $93,253.43 was excessive, unsupported, and unjust. By
making such an award, the trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law. This
Court should therefore reverse and vacate the judgment awarding costs.
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1. The trial court erred in awarding costs as a matter of right that are
not allowed under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C).

A trial court errs if it awards nondiscretionary costs that are not expressly allowed by
Rule 54(d)(1)(C).247

"In awarding non-discretionary costs the trial court must follow the

guidelines in LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C).,,248 "The question ofa trial court's compliance with the rules
of civil procedure relating to the recovery of attorney fees or costs is one of law upon which an
.
fr
. ,,249
appe11 ate court exercIses
ee reVIew.
The trial court erred as a matter of law in its award of non-discretionary costs under
LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C) in the amount of $182.81 for "Attempted Service", $415.00 for "Reporting
& Transcribing" depositions that were canceled, and $500.00 for transcription fees as "exhibit

preparation" for a transcript that was never used in a hearing or tria1. 250 These are not costs that
can be awarded under Rule 54(d)(1)(C) as non-discretionary costS. 251 Rule 54(d)(1)(C)(2) only
allows for "[a]ctual fees for service of any pleading or document in the action whether served by
a public officer or other person. ·,252 Attempted service is not a cost that can be awarded as a
matter of right under Rule 54( d) (1 )(C)(2). Similarly, "[ c]harges for reporting and transcribing of
a deposition taken" may be awarded under LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(c)(9); costs for canceled depositions

247 George W Watkins Family v. Messenger, 115 Idaho 386, 391 (App. 1988).
248 !d.
249 J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Intern., Inc., 130 Idaho 255, 257 (1997).
250 Supp. R. pp. 51-52 ("2,6,9),61, 138; Tr. (9/15/11),24: 10-23.
251 George W Watkins Family, 115 Idaho 386, 391 (App. 1988) (trial court cannot award nondiscretionary costs that are not expressly enumerated under Rule 54(d)(1)(C)).
252 !d.
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cannot. 253 Finally, costs for preparation of exhibits are only allowed as a matter of right if the
exhibit was ·'admitted in evidence ... in a hearing or trial of an action.,,254
2. The trial court erred by awarding discretionary costs where the trial court
relieved the Defendants of their burden of proof and did not make the required
express findings necessary to support such an award.
The trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law by awarding
discretionary costs under LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) without first requiring the Ada County Defendants
to prove why the specific items of discretionary costs should be allowed, and further by not
making express findings that the costs were necessary, exceptional, reasonably incurred, and
should be awarded in the interest of justice. 255

The court may award a prevailing party

discretionary costs only where there is an adequate "showing that the costs are necessary and
exceptional, reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the
adverse party. ,,256
3. The trial court erred by relieving the Defendants of their initial burden.
The party requesting discretionary costs has the initial burden of showing the costs were
necessary, exceptional, and reasonable and should in the interest of justice be awarded. 257 A
party failing to show why the costs are necessary, exceptional and reasonably incurred is not

253 LR.C.P. 54(d)(I)(C)(9) (emphasis added).
254 LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C)(6) (emphasis added); George W Watkins Family v. Messenger, 115
Idaho 386, 391 (Ct. App. 1988) (trial court erred by awarding non-discretionary costs of exhibits
not admitted as evidence).
255 See Supp. R. pp. 23-89, 98-132,138-41; Tr. (9/15/11), 8:8-10:20, 24:10-31:20.
256 LR.C.P. 54(d)(I)(D) (emphasis added).
257 LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D); Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314-315
(2005); Auto. Club Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 124 Idaho 874, 880-881 (1993).
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entitled to discretionary costS. 258 "The party must also show that the costs should be assessed
against the adverse party 'in the interest of justice .. ,.259
Exceptional costs "include those costs incurred because the nature of the case was itself
exceptional.,,260 Routine litigation costs are not exceptiona1. 261 Even fees for experts who were
.
1 to the case may be ord'mary costs. 267mstrumenta
The Ada County Defendants did not meet their burden of proof for an award of
discretionary costs, and the trial court did not make the necessary express findings.

The

Defendants' initial filing lacked any argument as to why the case was exceptional, why the costs
were incurred because of the alleged exceptional nature of the case, or why the costs were
necessary and reasonably incurred. 263 Nor did the Defendants attempt to prove that the requested
award
would be in the interest ofjustice. 264 After Ms. Hoagland moved to disallow discretionary
00
costs on the grounds that the Defendants failed to meet their burden of proof, the Defendants

Auto. Club, 124 Idaho at 880-881; Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 314-315.
Auto. Club, 124 Idaho at 880-881; Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 314-315; see also, Swallow v.
Emergency Medicine of Idaho, 138 Idaho 589, 598 (2003) (reversed award of discretionary costs
because the trial court did not make a finding that the award was in the interest of justice).
260 Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 314; see also, lnama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377, 384 (1999) (trial
court's denial of discretionary costs upheld where costs were found to be reasonable and
necessary but not exceptional).
261 See, e.g., Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 493-494 (1998) (denial of expert fees was not an
abuse of discretion where the fees were the type of fees routinely required by the type of case at
issue); Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 314 ("Certain cases, such as personal injury cases, generally
involve copy, travel and expert witness fees such that these costs are considered ordinary rather
than 'exceptional' under LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D)").
767
~ - Evans v. State, 135 Idaho 422, 432 (App. 2001).
263 Supp. R. pp. 23-41,44-56.
264 1d.
258
259
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attempted to provide support for their claim of discretionary costs with an unsubstantiated,
conclusory argument. 265 Even with their late filing, the Defendants still failed to meet their
burden, and thereby left the trial court without grounds to award discretionary costs.
4. The Defendants did not meet their burden of proving that this case was
exceptional.

Ada County Defendants argued that this case was exceptional because it was a § 1983
action brought in state court, and because the case involved "unique factual scenarios and legal
arguments which typically do not appear in a standard tort claim.,o266 That a § 1983 case is
brought in state court is no basis for finding that the case is exceptional because a § 1983
plaintiff has a right under federal law to bring the case in state or federal court. 267 Neither is the
fact that a § 1983 claim is not a state tort claim any reason for finding the case to be exceptional.
This was a constitutional tort case for personal injury with many similarities to a standard state
tort claim for personal injuries. The difference between a standard state tort claim and a § 1983
claim for personal injury is the source and nature of the duty breached by the defendant. 268
The Defendants did not show why this case was exceptional. The trial court erred by
relieving the Defendants of their burden of proof while still awarding their requested
discretionary costs. Doing so was a misapplication of LR.C.P. 54(d)(1 )(D) and therefore was an

265 Supp. R. pp. 57-89,98-132.
266 Supp. R. p. 73; Tr. (9/15/11), 8:8-10:20, 24: 10-31 :20.
267 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 358 (U.S. 1990).
268 See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983) (section 1983 "was intended to create "a species of
tort liability' in favor of persons deprived of federally secured rights") (quoting Carey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,417 (1976)).
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error of law as well as an abuse of discretion.

5. The Defendants did not meet their burden of proving the costs were incurred
because of the alleged exceptional nature of the case.
Even assuming that the Ada County Defendants met the threshold showing that this case
was exceptional, they failed to meet the threshold showing that specific costs were incurred
because of the alleged exceptional nature of the case. 269 That this case was in state court does
not make all costs exceptional. The costs of a § 1983 case would be the same in state or federal
court. While the Defendants claimed the case involved unique legal arguments and procedures,
they did not prove the costs were incurred because of the alleged exceptional nature of the
case.270 The costs claimed and awarded were largely for factual development-not for legal
research, briefing, or other matters relating to legal arguments and procedure.

The novel

questions of law that arose in the case had little to no bearing on the claimed discretionary costs.
For instance, the trial court awarded $12,140.53 in travel expenses without evidence
showing why the costs were incurred as a result of the allegedly exceptional nature of the case,
or why the costs were necessary or reasonably incurred. 271

The travel expenses awarded

included a trip to San Francisco for three attorneys, one of whom was Mr. Mallet, who is the
Sheriffs chief legal counsel and not counsel of record. 272 There was no showing as to the
necessity and reasonableness of Mr. Mallet's expenses or for the necessity and reasonableness of

See Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 314.
See Supp. R. pp. 23-89, 98-132,138-41; Tr. (9/15/11), 8:8-10:20, 24:10-31:20.
Id.
272 See R. pp.2477-78 (deposition transcript showing Sheriffs chief legal advisor, J. Mallet
present for the deposition of Johnson in San Francisco); Supp. R. pp. 53, 140.
269

270
271
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three attorneys for one deposition in San Francisco. 273

Travel costs awarded included

investigative expenses for travel to Sacramento and Portland, but there was no showing why the
investigator's expenses were necessary or reasonable?74
The trial court also awarded $509.36 in postage, notary charges, and Federal Express
charges without any support or argument that the costs were exceptional, necessary, reasonable,
and awardable in the interest of justice. 275 The trial court awarded $1,181.52 for "AES Temp
Employee" without any support for that charge. 276 There was no explanation as to what the
charge was for, who it was paid to, or why it was exceptional, necessary, reasonable and just that
Ms. Hoagland pay those charges. 277
Fees of $63,060.83 were awarded for six defense experts. 278 Another $1,700.00 was
awarded as fees paid to Ms. Hoagland's experts without explanation or support. 279 None of the
experts testified in a deposition or hearing, and much of what was offered by the experts was
cumulative?80
Copy costs of $303.00 were awarded without explanation of how the records related to
the litigation and why they were exceptional, necessary, and reasonable and should justly be

See Supp. R. pp. 23-89, 98-132, 138-41; Tr. (9/15/11), 5:4-35:22.
Id. No depositions were taken in Sacramento or Portland.
Id.
276 I d.
277 Id.
273

274
275

278 Supp. R. pp. 138-40.
279 d.
I
280 See Supp. R. pp.23-89, 98-132, 138-41; Tr. (9/15/11), 5:4-35:22; HoaglandCONF .pdf,
pp. 145-278 (Defense Expert Affidavits).
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awarded. 281 Another $490.00 was awarded for transcription fees of Jail calls without any basis
to believe the transcripts were ever filed with the trial court. 282 No argument was made as to
why these costs were necessary or reasonable, or why the interest of justice would be served by
making such an award. 283 Finally, $233.75 was awarded for an investigator without explanation
as to why such an expense was exceptional, necessary, and reasonable and justified as an
award. 284
No attempt was made by the Defendants to explain why it was necessary to incur such
excessive costs, why the costs were incurred due to the allegedly exceptional nature of the case,
why their costs were reasonable, and why, in the interest of justice, Ms. Hoagland should pay
these expenses?85 The trial court erred as a matter of law by relieving the Defendants of their
burden of proof. With free review over a trial court's compliance with Rule 54 when awarding
discretionary costs, this Court should reverse the discretionary costs award. 286
6. The trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law by awarding
discretionary costs without making express findings.

The trial court failed to make all of the express findings required by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D)
for awarding discretionary costs. Specifically, the trial court never explained how the costs were
necessary and reasonably incurred, and never tied its conclusions to the actual costs it

Id.
282 See Supp. R. pp. 23-89, 98-132,138-41; Tr. (9/15/11), 5:4-35:22.
283 Id.
284 Id.
281

285

Id.

286

JR. Simpiot Co. v. Chemetics Intern., Inc., 130 Idaho 255, 257 (1997).
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awarded. 287 The failure to comply with LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) was an abuse of discretion and an
error of law.

In ruling on objections to requested costs, a trial court "shall make express

findings as to why such specific items of discretionary cost should or should not be

allowed.,,288 A trial court abuses its discretion if it does not make "express findings as required
by LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) with regard to the general character of the requested costS.,,289
Here, the trial court adopted Ada County's unsubstantiated arguments and concluded that
the case was exceptional. 29o Then, the trial court summarily concluded that the costs were also
necessary and reasonably incurred without explaining the basis for those two separate
conclusions. 291
Therefore, because of the nature of the claims in this case and the
complexity of the work Defendants undertook to defend against
those claims, Defendants [sic] request for discretionary costs for
deposition travel costs, expert fees, copies of records, and
investigator fees were exceptional, necessary, and reasonably
incurred. 292
In doing so, the trial court referenced each category of costs but never discussed any of the actual
costs involved?93 Merely identifying a category of costs such as "deposition travel costs" and

See Supp. R. pp. 138-41.
288 LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) (emphasis added); see Bingham v. Montane Resource Assoc., 133 Idaho
420, 425 (1999) (reversed award where there was no express finding of exceptional, necessary,
reasonable and in the interest of justice); Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 314 (trial court must make
"express findings as to the general character of the requested costs and whether such costs are
necessary, reasonable, exceptional, and in the interest of justice").
289 Great Plains Equip. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 474 (2001).
290 Supp. R. pp. 138-40.
291 Supp. R. p. 140.
287

292

[d.

293 Supp. R. pp. 13 8-41.
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concluding it is a necessary and reasonable cost is not the same as making an express finding as
to the general character of the requested costs.

While an item-by-item finding may not be

required, an "express finding as to the general character of the requested cost" requires more than
merely lumping generic categories together and saying they were exceptional, necessary and
reasonable.

Here, the trial court never tied Ada County's arguments to the actual costs

awarded. 294

For the reasons already stated, the trial court's reasoning does not support its

conclusion that this case was exceptional. The trial court provided no reason for its conclusion
that the requested costs were necessary and reasonably incurred. And none of the trial court's
conclusions stand up when compared to the actual costs that were awarded. There is such a
disconnect between the trial court's conclusions and the actual costs awarded that the trial court's
findings cannot satisfy the requirements of I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D).

As such, the award of

discretionary costs must be reversed.
7. The trial court erred as a matter oflaw by failing to apply the '''in the interest of
justice" element of I.R.C.P. S4(d)(I)(D) correctly.
The trial court based its decision to award discretionary costs under the interest of justice
element by finding that "it is not unjust to award discretionary costs here:,295 That is not the
standard under by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D). The trial court correctly recognized that a prerequisite to
awarding discretionary costs was "whether it is in the interest of justice to assess discretionary
costs against Plaintiff.,,296 The trial court, however, never made that finding. Instead, the trial

294 See Supp. R. pp. 138-41.
295 Supp. R. p. 140.
296 !d.
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court inverted LR.C.P. 54(d)(I)(D)'s '·in the interest of justice" requirement and put the burden
of proof on Ms. Hoagland to show it would be unjust to award the costs against her:
The remaining consideration for the Court is whether it is in the
interest of justice to assess discretionary costs against Plaintiff.
This is a discretionary decision for the Court. Reasonable minds
may differ as to whether it is in the interest of justice to award
discretionary costs to Defendants. The natural inclination in a case
such as this is to feel sympathy for a parent whose child died
young and tragically. However, it is not unjust to award
discretionary costs here. The Court finds it is in the interest of
justice to award discretionary costs to Defendants. 297
The trial court failed to articulate why it was in the interest of justice to make such an award.
Declaring that an award of costs would not be unjust is not adequate support for the affirmative
finding that such an award was being made in the interest of justice. 298
It is clear from the trial court's comments during the hearing that it believed that
Ms. Hoagland had the burden of showing that it would be unjust to award discretionary costs
. her.-)99
agamst

You know, do I really have enough, though, in the record other
than just my supposition based on those phone calls which were
submitted for a different purpose, to conclude as a matter of fact
that she is poor?300
The trial court requested additional briefing on the issue, and both parties submitted briefs with
supporting affidavits. 301 While the Ada County Defendants were unable to cite to a single case

Supp. R. p. 140.
298 See Swallow, 138 Idaho at 598 (reversed discretionary costs award because the trial court did
not make a finding that the award was in the interest of justice).
299 Tr. (9/15111), 8:16-9:11, 20:11-14, 25:4-31:20, 32:5-35:2.
300 Tr. (9115111), 30:12-16.
301 Tr. (9115111), 51:22-52:6, 32:5-35:2; Supp. R. pp. 98-132.
297
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addressing whether ability to pay was a consideration under the justice prong of Rule 54,
Ms. Hoagland cited the trial court to multiple cases holding that ability to pay should be
considered, along with secondary sources supporting the same conclusion. 302

Ms. Hoagland

submitted an affidavit showing her limited ability to pay.303 Nevertheless, the trial court made
no conclusions oflaw or finding of fact on the subject. 304
The trial court gave Ada County every opportunity to provide it with some basis for
finding that it was in the interest of justice to award discretionary costs against Ms. Hoagland,
and yet, no basis was provided. The trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to consider
Ms. Hoagland's ability to pay, failing to make a finding as to whether she should pay in the
interest of justice, and in placing the burden of proof on her to rebut the Ada County Defendants'
claim for discretionary costs. For that reason, this Court should reverse the judgment of costs.
8. The trial court erred by not properly considering Ms. Hoagland's financial
status and the devastating impact of the cost award.
A trial court must make specific findings as to whether it is in the interest of justice to
assess discretionary costs against an adverse party, and failure to do so is reversible error. 305 The
ability to pay is an equitable factor to be considered by a trial court under the "in the interest of
justice" prong of LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D).

In this case, the trial court failed to make specific

302 Supp. R. pp. 118-32.
303 Supp. R. pp. 114-17.
304 Supp. R. p. 140.
305 Swallow, 138 Idaho at 598; Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'! Med. etr., 134 Idaho 46, 60 (Idaho
2000); see also Richard J and Esther E. Wooley Trust, 133 Idaho 180, 188 (1999) (party
requesting discretionary costs "must also show that the costs should be assessed against the
adverse party 'in the interest of justice' ").
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findings as to the financial status of Ms. Hoagland. 306
Although this Court has never decided the issue of whether "ability to pay" should be
considered as part of the "in the interest of justice" inquiry, the federal courts have held that it is
reversible error not to include that equitable consideration before awarding fees and costS. 30 7
All of the federal cases cited supra footnote 307 dealt with costs "as a matter of course"
and not with discretionary cost awards. The presumption that normally exists for costs "as a
matter of right" does not apply to discretionary cost awards because the burden is on the
requesting party to prove it should be awarded discretionary costS. 30 8 A party does not have to

Supp. R. pp. 20-22, 66, 73-78, 81-88, 98-144; Tr. (9115111), 8:8-20,28:22-31 :20.
See Toliver v. County of Sullivan, 957 F.2d 47, 49-50 (2 nd Cir. 1992) (court must consider
ability to pay in awarding fees); Faraci v. Hickey-Freeman Co., 607 F.2d 1025, 1028-29 (2 nd Cir.
1979) (ability to pay is part of equitable consideration in fee award decision); Weaver v. Toombs,
948 F.2d 1004,1013 (6 th Cir. 1991) (indigence may be a consideration in awarding or denying
costs); Haynie v. Ross Gear Division of TRW, Inc., 799 F.2d 237 (6 th Cir.), vacated as moot, 482
U.S. 901 (1987) (required examination of plaintiffs ability to afford costs before an assessment
is made); Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1165 (7th Cir. 1983) ("This Court
has recently stated that the inability to pay is a proper factor to be considered in granting or
denying taxable costs"); Stanley v. University of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1079 (9 th Cir. 1999)
("We conclude that the district court abused its discretion, particularly based on the district
court's failure to consider two factors: Stanley's indigency, and the chilling effect of imposing
such high costs on future civil rights litigants"); Durrett v. Jenkins Brickyard, Inc., 678 F.2d 911,
917 (11 th Cir. 1982) (consideration in awarding fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case
is ability of plaintiff to pay fees); Baez v. United States Dept. of Justice, 684 F.2d 999, 1004
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (survey of federal circuits on whether ability to pay is a factor in awarding
costs); Robinson v. City ofN Olmstead, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17668 (N.D. Ohio May 7,1997)
(denying costs in § 1983 case where plaintiff could not afford to pay); see also Liability of
Allegedly Indigent Litigant for Costs Under FR.C.P. 54(d)(l), 25 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 471 (2008);
Financial considerations as affecting court's discretion, 21A Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 50: 1213.
308 Auto. Club, 124 Idaho at 880-881.
306
307
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be indigent to avoid discretionary costs being assessed. 309 The question is not whether a party is
indigent so much as whether an award of costs might make them indigent. 3lo
In Legros v. Jewell, the Superior Court of Delaware declined to award costs under 54(d)
against a non-prevailing plaintiff because the plaintiff was of modest means working at a chicken
factory. 3 11
Rule 54(d) provides that costs will be allowed as of course to the
prevailing party "unless the Court otherwise directs." There is no
doubt that an assessment of costs against the plaintiffs in this case
would be a severe financial hardship, and in all probability would
simply become an uncollectible assessment serving no real
purpose. Even if the plaintiffs, despite hardship, could afford to
pay the costs, I do not believe it would be appropriate to burden
these unsuccessful plaintiffs with these costS. 312
In Pulawa v. GTE Hawaiian Tel., it was held that the "most important equitable factor is
indigency or inability to pay. ,,313
In this case, Ms. Hoagland works as a cook at a restaurant in Melba, Idaho, making $8.00
per hour working six-and-a-halfhour shifts three days per week. 3 14 She started working there in

309 Cherry v. Champion International Corporation, 186 F.3d 442, 446 (1999) (a party "of such
modest means that it would be unjust or inequitable to enforce Rule 54(d)(1 Y' should not be
taxed costs).
th
310 Stanley v. University ofS. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1079-80 (9 Cir. 1999); see also Thompson v.
Vista View, LLC, 2009 WL 3334192 (S.D. Va.) (requiring a party to pay half of their annual
salary to cover costs is unjust); Rivera v. NIB CO, 701 F. Supp. 1135, 1144 (E.D. Ca. 2010) (it is
an abuse of discretion not to consider the plaintiff s limited financial resources when determining
whether to deny costs).
311 2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 194 (2001) (unpublished).
312 Id; see also Nelson v. Feldman, 2011 WL 531946 (Del. Super. 2011) (unpublished)
(appropriate to consider ability to pay discretionary costs).
313 143 P.3d 1205, 1224 (2006).
314 Supp. R. pp. 114-17.
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January 2011 and was unemployed prior to that. 315 She has no significant earnings history.316
She has no significant assets to speak of. 317

The home in which she resides is valued at

approximately $177,520, and has a mortgage of approximately $55,000.00 with monthly
payments of $303.00. 318 Mr. Hoagland earns $14.00 per hour as a truck driver and works 40
hours per week. 319 Other than their home, they have no significant assets.
A non-prevailing party's ability to pay discretionary costs is an equitable consideration
under LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) and the trial court erred as a matter oflaw when it failed to make that
consideration.
9. Conclusion.
In awarding the Ada County Defendants $93,253.43 in costs, the trial court committed
numerous errors oflaw and abused its discretion under LR.C.P. 54. It awarded costs that are not
allowed under the law. It relieved the Ada County Defendants of their burden of proof. It failed
to make the required express findings. It failed to correctly apply the "in the interest of justice"
prong of LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D). The award of $93,253.43 is excessive, unsupported, and unjust.
By making such an award, the trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law. This
Court should therefore reverse and vacate the judgment awarding costs.

315
316

Id.
I d.

317

!d.

318

Id.

319

!d.
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H.

Request For Attorney Fees

In the event that she is the prevailing party, Ms. Hoagland should be awarded attorney
fees and costs on her appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-107 and 12-121 and Idaho Appellate
Rules 40 and 41. The § 1983 claims brought by Ms. Hoagland expressly allow for recovery of
costs and fees to a prevailing § 1983 plaintiff. 320
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, this Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to Wroblewski, Johnson, Ada County, and Pape, and remand for trial. Genuine issues
of material fact exist that preclude summary judgment and it was reversible error for the trial
court to grant these parties judgment. For the same reasons, this Court should reverse the trial
court's cost award, and award Ms. Hoagland fees and costs on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of February, 2012.
JONES &

SWARTZ~P=LL=--_

DAR
ERIC

'

. OVERSON

B. SWARTZ
JoyM. BINGHAM

See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); Miller v. Ririe Joint Sch. Dist. No. 252,132 Idaho 385, 387 (1999)
("A party who prevails on a civil rights claim under § 1983 is entitled to seek recovery of
attorney fees under § 1988:') (citations omitted); McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097,
1101 (9 th Cir. 2009) (""Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a court may award the prevailing party in a
§ 1983 claim 'a reasonable attorney's fee as part ofthe costs.''')
320
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